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Beyond old horizons: Theorising the rhythms of social reproduction

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Abstract
The question of how organizations are produced has been an ongoing theoretical puzzle within organization studies. In order to explain this question an increasing number of organization theorists have turned to the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens. Indeed it has been widely used to examine a whole range of organization phenomena such as structure (Ranson, Hinings & Greenwood, 1980), control (Clegg, 1981), discourse (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001), technology (Orlikowski, 1992), and institutions (Barley & Tolbert, 1997). In this paper we would like to call into question this increasingly popular approach. In particular we would like to explore some of the limits of structuration theory. We would like to argue that social reproduction of organization involves the reproduction of space and time. By doing so, we would like to put issues of time and space right at the centre of debates about structuration and social reproduction.

Introduction

In this paper we address the theory of social reproduction. We begin with the most influential contemporary account of social reproduction, which can be found in Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration. We then register four vital criticisms of structuration: the relationship between which structure and agency is built upon, its' conception of structure, its' conception of agency, and its' conception of time-space. We then seek to make modifications to the theory of structuration, which redress each criticism. In particular we suggest the following; Structure and agency should be held as analytically distinct alongside a third factor we call projected outcomes. Structure should be conceptualised as resources, regimes and cultural schemas. Agency involves three distinct temporal orientations -- past focused repetitive behaviour, present focused practical-evaluative behaviour, and future focused projective behaviour. Social reproduction happens through three distinct modes of space-time -- the practiced, the planned, and the imagined. We link each of these components of social reproduction together into a trialectic of past, present and future. We then add a dynamic to these categories by introducing the concept of rhythm. This allows us to theorise the recurrent patterns of social reproduction. It also allows us to identify three basic rhythms of social reproduction -- routine rhythms, practical rhythms, and projective rhythms. We conclude the paper by reflecting on what our concepts adds to the post-structuration debate about social reproduction theory.

Structuration theory

Strcuturation emerged as an important account of social reproduction against the backdrop of two dominant logics of sociological explanation (Archer, 1988). On the one hand, Holists understand social life as reproduced through social structures that determine the capacities and possibilities for agency. On the other hand, individualists understand social life as produced by the ongoing activities of knowledgeable human agents. There was a long history of antagonism between each of these two dominant explanations of social reproduction. Holists accused the Individualists of disregarding the systematic features that give an agent the capacity to 'enact' the world or make rational choices. In contrast, Individualists accused Holists of disregarding
the role of actual actors in shaping and reshaping the social world. This impasse was largely solved by a series of 'middle range' accounts, which reject the false choice between a Holist focus on structure or an Individualist focus on agency. The most influential of these 'middle range' approaches in the Anglo-American social theory is Anthony Giddens' work on structuration (Giddens, 1976, 1979, 1981, 1984).

Giddens set out to overcome the structure-agent debate by shifting the focus of social theory away from either structure or the agent to social practice (1984). The starting point of reference for social theory should not be where something is undertaken (ie. the structural conditions), or who undertakes that action (ie. Agency), but the practice itself. Practice involves the continuous stream of practical activities which make up social life. Some basic practices include walking, reading, buying, selling, loving, fighting.

Giddens adds that social practices are mediated by a duality of structure and agency. A duality of structure and agency highlights "the fundamentally recursive character of social life, and expresses the mutual dependency of structure and agency" (Giddens, 1979, p. 69). This is to say, social practices both occur through, and are produced by the dual interaction of structure and agency. In effect, they are 'both the medium and the outcome of practices which constitute the social system' (Giddens, 1981, p. 27). Based on mutually constitutive and successive iterations between structure and agency social life is therefore approached as a recursive, and cyclical phenomena.

A structuration model approaches structure, or more precisely structuring, as the rules and resources which are extended across time and space. Accordingly, Giddens defines social structures as "the structuring properties allowing the 'binding' of time-space in social systems, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space which lend them 'systematic' form" (Giddens, 1984, p. 17). There are a number of crucial points, which need to be drawn out. First, the noun of 'structure' is replaced with the verb of 'structuring'. This implies that social structuring is something that is actively done. Second, the process of structuring involves the 'binding' of time-space in social systems. A social system is "the situated activities of human agents, reproduced across time and space" (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). This means that structuring involves repetition of certain social action in different situations. Third, structuring is evident when a systematic pattern of repeated social action happens in different time-spaces. This implies that there is structuring when we can observe similar patterns of social action happening in far flung places or at different periods of time. Bringing this definition together, structuring should be understood as a process, which involves the systematic repetition of social activity in varying time-spaces.

According to Giddens, structuring is undertaken through the mobilisation of rules and resources. Rules are the “techniques or generalizable procedures applied in the enactment/reproduction of social practices” (Giddens, 1984, p. 21). For Giddens then, a rule is our understanding of what is the right or wrong course of action in a particular situation. These might be encoded in formal legal rules, but they also might remain unarticulated in societal norms. Resources are "the media through which power is exercised" (Giddens, 1979, p. 91). For Giddens, resources are any means through which actors might exercise power. There are two broad types of resources through which power might be exercised: allocative resources and authoritative resources. For Giddens, authoritative resources are those which "generate command over persons" (Giddens, 1979, p. 100), while allocative resources are those "which generate command over objects or other material phenomena" (Giddens, 1979, p. 100). Bringing this together, Giddens understands structures as "rules-resource sets, implicated in the institutional articulation of society"
Alongside a novel theory of structuring, Giddens provides a unique account of agency. For him, agency is the mobilisation of structural properties. More precisely, agency may be defined as the “stream of actual or contemplated causal interventions of corporeal beings in the ongoing process of events-in-the-world” (Giddens, 1976, p. 75). Out of this early formulation we can draw a number of crucial features (Giddens, 1979, pp. 55-56). First, agency occurs over time and involves a “continuous flow of conduct”. This suggests that agency entails a routine series of acts that are repeated across time. Second, agency involves intervention into the world of objects. This suggests that agency involves the capacity to alter crucial structural 'objects' such as rules and resources. Finally, agency implies at least a minimum potential freedom in that in any given situation an agent could have acted otherwise. At the heart of these defining characteristics is an understanding of agency as a routine attempt to intervene in social structure with some minimal freedom.

Given these defining characteristics, Giddens goes on to sketch a model of agency to match his conception of structure. The first component of this model is the reflexive monitoring of action which suggests that actors continually reflect on the intentions and purposes of their action as well as how their action fits into a particular setting of interaction. Following the monitoring of action, actors may provide an account of their action which involves the ability of actors to 'explain' what they have done and why. The final component is what Giddens calls 'motivation'. This consists of the potential for action, rather than actual activity. Motives may come in either conscious form which the actor is aware of, practical form which the actor uses but does not enter into extensive discourse, or unconscious form which the actor is not aware of, does not enter into discourse, but still continues to motivate the actor. Crucially, Giddens adds that in any given setting action tends to be conditioned by series of unacknowledged circumstances, which may escape the actor and in so doing producing unintended consequences.

What is also vital to point out here is how, in congruence with the recursive conception of structuring, agency is deemed to have a repetitive, iterative and routine like character. In fact, it is this very cyclical relationship between structure and agency that induces the extension of culture through what is known as 'instantiation of structure'. That is, cultural rules and resources reproduce the very instant when they are drawn upon by the routine practices they recursively organise. At the everyday level, the notion of routine is therefore of central importance to the structuring process. Premised on the psychological need for a sense of ontological security, 'routine' functions as a shield against the 'potentially explosive' unconsciousness and enables the agent to carry out reflexive monitoring of ones actions. In effect, everyday social reproduction tends to take on a stabilising function.

Giddens brings his assumptions of duality, focus on social practice, conception of structure as rules and resources, concept of agency as routine, and 'instantiation of structure' together into his master concept of structuration. For Giddens, structuration is "the structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue of the duality of structure" (Giddens, 1984, p. 376). As such, Giddens recognises that structuration as an ongoing process is situated and occurs 'across time and space'. To be more specific, for Giddens, structuration is not abstracted but involves precisely defined and regionalised activities, which happen in the here-and-now of specific encounters. As we have already seen in his conception of agency, these processes of structuration tend to take on a routine, repetitive character. Thus, modes of structuration, which are successful, are those which are particularly enduring and become almost habitual.
Similarly, structuration processes can also be 'stretched' across space. For Giddens, a widespread 'social structure' should be approached as an ongoing process of structuration that has been stretched across the space. Bringing these points together, a widely accepted process of structuration is one which achieves greater extensity across time-space.

**Critiques of structuration theory**

Given that structuration has been widely acclaimed as a vital contribution to late twentieth century social theory, it is not surprising that it has been the target of a range of trenchant critiques (see: Bryant & Jary, 1997). Questions have been raised about most issues addressed in Giddens theory of structuration including the account of embodiment (Shilling, 1997), the account of emotion (Groarke, 2002), and the account of epistemology (Bryant, 1992). Here we would, however, like to focus on four major objections, which cut to the heart of Giddens account of structuration - his account of the relationship between agency and structure, his conception of agency, his conception of structure, and his conception of time-space. These objections help us to establish the central shortcomings of structuration theory, which must be surmounted if it is to provide a convincing theory of social reproduction.

The first objection raised by critics of structuration is the relation between structure and agency. Critics claim that Giddens 'flattens out' social reality by collapsing two fundamentally different orders of social reality - structure and agency, therefore disposing the unique characteristics of both structure and agency in favour of singular process of structuration (Archer, 1995; Mouzelis, 1989, 2000). The dire consequence of this is that the relative independence of structure and agency are disregarded. In other words, structurationists cannot account for the fact that structure or agency has existence even when it is not brought to life with by a process of structuration. For instance, a social structure like a law exists even if it is not mobilized by an agent. Eliding structure and agency also disregards the causal influence of both components. Structurationists effectively ignore how either structure or agency can have a causal influence, which is independent of one another. For instance, a structure such as a law might not be actively mobilised by a judge, but it nonetheless rules out possible courses of action. Finally, eliding structure and agency ignores the temporal precedence of each component. This means that it is impossible to consider how either component has an existence before the other component arrives on the scene. For instance, it becomes impossible to think about the existence of a legislator prior to the structure of the law that allows them to legislate. Ultimately structuration theory provides a 'flat' account of social reality. The upshot is that it becomes impossible to consider the unique qualities of structure and agency, and their dynamic relationship with one another.

The second objection to structuration is its conception of social structure, and how rules and resources are conceived as virtual at all times except when mobilised during “instantiation” (Sewell, 1992; see also Archer, 1995; Mouzelis, 1989, 2000). At all other times they are “outside space and time” (Mouzelis, 1989), as if they were suspended in a vacuum and hence independent of ongoing human agency (Manicas, 1980). As such, cultural rules and resources are conceived as mere objective “memory traces” (Sica, 1986) that do not evolve or change through contact with agency -- undermining therefore the hermeneutical 'two-way' relationship upon which the 'duality of structure' is premised on. Sewell states, however, that it is impossible to think of both human and non-human resources having a 'virtual' existence. For him, structures exist firmly in space and time and are independent and prior in existence to any act of structuration (Sewell, 1992). Formal rules such as laws are actual because they have a defined and identifiable existence, which is independent of processes of structuration. Some have even...
claimed that informal cultural rules have a real existence insofar as it is independent of an agent mobilising them (Archer, 1995)[is this what you mean?]. Accordingly, in order to provide a useful conception of social structure, it is necessary at the minimum to recognise that all elements of social structure are not virtual, but have a real existence as in the case of resources and formal laws.

The third objection raised by critics is the conception of agency it implies. There are two particular problems identified in this paper. Both are closely related to the two objections already made. Firstly, by collapsing structure and agency into the social practice of structuration, we are provided with an 'over-socialised' view of the agent that disregards any unique characteristics individuals might have. The implication is that structurationist accounts are unable to consider how the agent has characteristics that may precede a particular episode of social practice (Archer, 1995). An important corollary to this is that structuration theory is consequently unable to explain how actors are able to establish any distance from social practices (Mouzelis, 1989). Despite these problems, the idea of 'reflexivity' remains a strong theme is Giddens' theory. According to Giddens, reflexivity may occur in two ways: during non-discursive routines that allow actors to knowledgably reproduce past behaviour, or during discursive activities, which allow them to assess past action. This focus, however, traps structuration theory into an account of behaviour which is either oriented to the past through reproductive routines or is oriented to the present through practical-evaluative or 'reflexive' behaviour. The immediate effect of such tendencies is to condemn actors to the role of mere automatons, mechanically reproducing social structures through routines (Urry, 1991). As a consequence, structuration theory is unable to account for future-oriented projective behaviour (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998), and how actors might develop plans and undertake agential action. Secondly, by arguing that structures are outside time-space, Giddens creates a motionless, abstract representation of society. The main problem with this is that he subsequently theorises ontological security as achievable by adapting to such an abstraction. However, because of this initial autonomy between structures and time-space, agency, and in effect, the 'doing' of routine, are divorced from actual foundations. This is to say, because structure is suspended in an atemporal and aspatial vacuum, human agency is blocked out of the structuring cycle (Urry, 1991). Even during 'instantiation' of structure, agency is depicted as a mere receptor of structural conditioning, an abstraction that is divorced from reality, supposedly droning away, repeating routine practices that are informed by rules and resources that erroneously never change. Consequentially, in lacking any reference to actual situations, Giddens, seems to exaggerate the idea that maintenance of (an erroneously static) present through (identically) repetitive routine practices ensures ontological security. What is problematic is of course the fact that the world is not static, and by necessity then, neither are practices. In contrast, we therefore suggest that real grievance is induced if people cannot adapt to a changing world through transformative reproduction.

The final critique of Gidden's theory of structuration theory is his conception of time-space. As we have seen, an important conception of structuration theory is that it is seen to occur 'across' time and space, or more accurately, time-space. To provide a theory of time-space, Giddens' turns to the 'time geography' of Hägerstrand. This allows him to demonstrate how structuration involves the creation of bundles of behaviour at differing points of time-space. While this certainly introduces a temporal and spatial dynamic into his theorising, it does so by holding time-space as constant. Time-space is treated as a stable, container-like surface upon which movement might be mapped. It is this Newtonian view of time-space that also encourages the idea that time-space dictianciation can be accounted for through the 'stretching' of structuring processes.
Moreover, while this absolute approach to time-space is the primary cause of critique against structures being suspended in time-space vacuum (i.e., Mouzelis, 1989), and the notion of ontological security being erroneously based on abstraction, the further flip side of this 'coin', to use Giddens' own terminology, is the fact that, structuration is unable to chronically explain how human agency might reproduce time and space. Overall, Giddens fails to address how time-space might be produced through agency, ultimately then, also failing to explain how society changes.

Following these critiques, an adequate redress of structuration theory must fulfil the following conditions. First, it must hold structure and agency as analytically separate. Second, it must account for projective agency. Third, it must account for real resources and formal rules. Finally, it must account for the dynamic reproduction of time and space. In what follows, we shall seek to fulfil these criteria by modifying structuration.

**Rethinking the components of structuration theory**

In this section we shall seek to redress the four central problems of structuration theory - - the relationship between structure and agency, the account of structure, the account of agency, and the account of time-space. In doing so, we will argue that it is necessary to move from a dialectical account of structure and agency towards a trialetic account of spatio-temporally situated social action and reproduction.

**Reconceptualising the structure - Agency relation**

The first criticism we touched upon was Giddens conception of the relationship between structure and agency. We have seen that a range of social theorists have put forward compelling arguments for holding the two terms as analytically distinct and not collapsing them into the singular moment of social practice. We certainly agree that it is vital to consider structure and agency as analytically distinct components that have independent characteristics. However, we are uncertain whether an account of social reality can be exhausted by the dialect of structure and agency. This is because social interaction involves prior social conditions of action (structure), a process of interaction (agency), but also an outcome of that interaction (Archer, 1995; Stones, 2005).

In its current state, structuration cannot explain how changes in structure might occur. According to structuration, the outcome of interaction between structure and agency is yet another iteration of (identical) structure. The fact that the structure may have changed significantly during the iteration is overlooked. As Giddens states, “Daily life has a duration, a flow, but it does not lead anywhere, the very adjective 'day-to-day life', and its synonyms indicate that time here is constituted only in repetition” (Giddens, 1984, p. 35). In conceiving everyday life in a most banal and detrimental light, Giddens’ arrives at the mistaken conclusion that what is recursive and repetitive never transforms.

As an attempt to deal with this, Margret Archer (1995) has proposed the model of morphogenesis. This model has three components -- structural conditions, socio-cultural interaction, and structural elaboration or reproduction. By adding the third component she recognises the vital outcomes of social interaction. However, by characteristically treating these outcomes as real, she assumes that future outcomes are of the same ontological reality as past structural conditions, present socio-cultural interaction, and future structural elaboration or reproduction. This claim could only be true from an analytical point of view at the end of the causal chain of events. In other words, by overlooking the possibility of emergence and its accompanying ambiguities, the phases of morphogenesis display an abstracted form of hindsight wisdom, as if it were possible to develop some kind of analytic certainty about
and the completely constructed future. Finally, between the past and present actors have negotiated and interacted. The past is made up of "a completed chain of facts" which "presses and jolts against the present" (Brumbaugh, 1984, p. 22), the present is the locus of the experience of selection (ibid), and the future is the locus of vision. As we will argue below, each of these orientations cannot therefore be said to have the same real ontological status as the past clearly does for Archer.

The ontological character of present of interaction is more akin to what phenomenologists call 'the flow of perception' (Mead, 1932). The present is characterised by a marked degree of uncertainty, negotiation and effort on the part of the actor. Its ontological status is not separate from actors attempts to know the world, its causal characteristics are immediate, and it does not have any temporal precedence -- it only exists in the present moment. Thus the present of social action has a rather different ontological character than the past. It exists only in the momentary flow of social action (Mead, 1932). This suggests that the 'second' dimension of Archer's morphogenesis model, 'socio-cultural interaction', should be treated as having a different ontological character than past 'structural conditions'. This ontological character involves an actor in the world who is practically attempting to mediate between the real social structures of the past and the completely constructed future. Finally, the future of social interaction, 'structural elaboration', or what we call 'outcomes' certainly has an altogether different ontological character to the past and present. Because it is the future, it is mainly dependent on present action, indeterminate, and non-causal. As such, projections and imaginations about the future play an important role in social reality, but they are not real in Archers sense. Rather, the ontological character of the future is social construction. The result is that an adequate model of structuration should hold distinct three components of structure, agency and projected outcomes. Each of these points has a distinct ontology: the past is real, the present is practically negotiated, and the future is constructed. By holding these analytically indistinct, we are able to account for their independent characteristics as well as their dynamic interaction.

Reconceptualising structure

The second criticism we touched upon was Giddens inadequate account of social structure. Above, we detailed the argument that it is necessary to treat some aspects of Giddens' conception of social structure as having real instead of virtual existences. In particular, Sewell (1992) put forward a compelling argument for rethinking Giddens theory of social structure in terms of 'resources and cultural schemas' instead of 'resources and rules'. By resources Sewell means the actual human and non-human factors, which serve as a source of social power in present social interaction. By cultural schemas he means virtual "generalized procedures [which are] applied in the enactments/reproduction of social life" (Sewell, 1992, p. 8). These schemas provide a way of thinking about what the appropriate pattern of action should be. Sewell also argues that resources and cultural schemas should be understood as forming a duality, whereby they over-determine each other. Although Sewell's account goes some way to dealing with some obvious problems with Giddens' conception of structure, there still remains a significant 'remainder' (Archer, 1995). This significant remainder is the pre-
The structuration pattern of relationships between social actors. In order to account for this remainder, Realists like Archer have disposed of Giddens 'rule-resource' distinction in favour of a singular model of social structure. This move has a number of limitations. By disposing of the concept of resources, it becomes impossible to consider the independence of a material from the various social structures, which it is articulated within. Similarly, by disposing of the concept of cultural schema, it is difficult to account for the relative independence of cultural schemas from the sets of social relations into which they are positioned.

We shall avoid disposing of resources and cultural schemas. To do this we would like to argue that it is possible to account for the 'remainder' of social relations by introducing a third structural factor we will call governance regimes. A governance regime may be defined as the recurrent and systematic relationship between social roles with particular embedded interests. Governance regimes can take a number of different forms including kinship, markets, hierarchies, and networks (for recent account see: Crouch, forthcoming). These governance regimes comprise patterns of social relationships that are reproduced over time and space. By considering these regimes alongside resources and cultural schemas, it becomes possible to extend Giddens' theory of structuration in such a way that accounts for the remainder of social relationships, as well as systematically identify these types of social relations.

Reconceptualising agency

The third criticism of structuration theory involves its conception of agency. In particular, we noted that by focusing solely on (identically) repetitive and routine behaviour, theories of structuration are unable to firstly, account for strategic or projective action on the part of agents, and secondly, they seem to exaggerate the idea that maintenance of status quo through these (identically) repetitive routine practices ensures ontological security. Accordingly, for realists the inability to account for strategic action is largely because Giddens's provides an over-socialised vision of the self. This leads realists to turn towards psychological characteristics of actors to provide an account of why actors seek to distance themselves from the proscribed routines of social interaction and seek social structural change. In turn, instances of social structural change will be viewed as higher amongst actors with a certain psychological disposition (see: Archer, 2000), whilst simultaneously increasing the propensity of providing a psychological as opposed to sociological account of projective agency. The result is that instances of social change could potentially be reduced to mere cognitive characteristics. Secondly, in contrast to the misconception that existential stability is achieved through adaptation to a static world (one that is suspended from time-space), we suggest that ontological security is achieved if people are able to adapt to a changing world through equally transformational practices of reproduction.

Overall, instead of seeking to provide an account of agency reliant on internal psychology or static abstractions, we shall return to social action as the seat of agency by focusing on one of its central defining features - that of temporal. To do this, we follow Emirbayer and Misce (1998) who argue that agency has at least three defining temporal orientations. The first temporal orientation is towards the past and involves the routine reproduction of already given social structures. The second temporal orientation is toward the present, which involves practical-evaluative action. This is characterised by the pragmatic negotiation of present problems. The final orientation is towards the future and involves projective agency. This is characterised by bringing into being new states of social affairs.

What is important to note here is how the construction of both past and future always occur in the present. This to say, the locus of reality, insofar as it is constructed through
social action, is embedded in immediate process. However, this is not to go as far as Mead (1932, p. 12) when he states that “the meaningful structure of the past is as hypothetical as the future”. Rather, as mentioned earlier, whilst the past has real status, the present is a negotiation (and the future a construction).

Furthermore, what is unique here is that each component is not a particular individual psychological-type, but involves a type of social agency. This means that it is perfectly possible for an actor to undertake a range of agential orientations. By revising agency as a series of temporal orientations to the past, present and future it becomes possible to account for projective agency that seeks to escape from the routine repetition of existing social practices and agency in the present.

**Reconceptualising time-space**

The final criticism of Giddens theory of structuration is his conception of time-space. Firstly, Realist critics of Giddens have focused on his conception of time. They have argued it is necessary to consider the temporal sequence of interaction of structure and agency. The major implication here is that characteristics of structural conditions are temporally prior to the process of socio-cultural interaction which emerges within them, and the subsequent structural reproduction or elaboration (Archer, 1995). The concept of temporality, which we are offered here is a singular conception of time. This cannot account for the multiple temporalities that Emirbayer and Mische (1998) argue are present in any process of social interaction. It also leaves untouched the problem of the how temporality might be changed and reconstructed through repeat social interaction. Finally, it says nothing of how time and space are inseparably coupled and how they are also reproduced through social interaction. As such, despite all the above amendments made to structuration theory, what is still left accounted for is the problematic independence between structure and agency and time-space (Urry, 1991). The split between the structuration process and space-time is neatly observed in Giddens' often-used phrase – structuration occurs across 'time-space'. As discussed earlier, such a formulation does not recognise how processes of structuration are also chronically implicated in the reproduction of space-time.

In order to provide an adequate account as to how structure may extend itself through time-space, we shall turn to Lefebvre's (1991, 2004) work. In particular, Lefebvre argues that the reproduction of both time and space are central to any process of social reproduction. This suggests that time-space is not a static stage upon which acts of structuration take place. Instead, social interaction fundamentally reproduces the time-space in which it acts. Following these principles, it is suggested that we add a further dimension to the reproductive dynamics so far presented. For social action to be interpreted as reproducing the time-space in which it acts, the analysis of this social action must be grounded in an epistemology of time-space. In other words, the three distinct ontological orientations of past, present, future, when operationalised (always in the present), are enacted upon by an agent whom has at his/her disposal a more or less conscious knowledge of the various temporal and spatial forces that are in play in any given situation. An important caveat here, however, is how some time-space(s) may be invisible or hidden from the agent, either practically or mentally (Lefebvre, 1991, 2004). Drawing from Lefebvre (1991) and the tradition of Dialectical Materialism (see Elden, 2004; Shields, 1996), what this formulation represents is the time-space producing interplay between ontology (form) and epistemology (content).

To recap, in any given context of action, be it past, present or future orientated, the actor is in a continuous cycle of reproduction with resources, cultural schemas and governance regimes. While doing so, these social structures are, among other things, at least partially experienced and interpreted by their
spatio-temporal virtues. As such, what is in fact produced between the cycle of structure and agency is not only continuance of social life but also space(s) and time(s) per se. This is not to say, however, that all social structures can be explicitly translated into a spatio-temporal form. Neither does this mean that all time-space production is the result of conscious action. Nevertheless, what is at stake here, is the undeniably increasing spatial and temporal nature of society (see Adam, 1990, 1995; Castells, 1996; Harvey, 1989; Sack, 1992; Young, 1988). There are at least three modes of time-space involved in the reproduction of social processes.

First there is the practical - phenomenal dimension of time-space, which involves spatio-temporal practices, and by definition implies the function of production and reproduction (of social relations). Practical-phenomenal time-space implies a perception of time as something that does not pass, nor cannot be wasted or saved (Evans-Pritchard, 1940). As such, time should be perceived as embedded within actions, events and roles (Mead 1934). By the same token, practical-phenomenal time-space has to do with the physically perceived body in so far as the “relationship to space of a 'subject'... implies his relationship to his own body and vice versa” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 40). As it is treated here, practical-phenomenal time-space therefore entails the phenomenology of practiced actions (Schutz, 1971) and its accompanying sense of perceived temporality (Merleau Ponty, 1969).

Second, there is the 'planned-apparent' dimension of time-space, which involves practical 'top-down' attempts to order social space through planning as well as the organisation of time through measurement such as clocks. Here, time is treated as an abstract, linear and impersonal resource (Sorokin & Merton, 1937; Durkheim, 1968) that has to be maximised in its utility. “Waste of time is... the first and in principle, the deadliest of sins” (Weber, 1930, p. 158). Space as 'apparent' involves the mentally conceived aspects of social space. It is abstract insofar as the subject's relation to the body is in the form of reified scientific knowledge (Lefebvre, 1991). Planned-apparent time-space is that invisible power and order that is imposed on the relations of production. It is “...conceptualised [time-] space, the [time-] space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers, as of a certain type of artist with a scientific bent - all of whom identify what is lived and what is perceived with what is conceived” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 33). As mentioned above, there are in other words no guarantees that what is 'conceivable' is actually conceived consciously by the agent. Much of the oppressive and alienating power of time-space(s) therefore resides in this dimension. Planned-apparent time-space is by definition abstract and uncritical. It may appear homogeneous but it is not, rather it has homogeneity as its goal - it renders homogeneity much like Adorno and Horkeheimer's (1997) “Culture Industry” when diffusing what was once differentiated art into products of mass consumption: “A representation which passes itself off as a concept, when it is merely an image, a mirror, and a mirage; and which, instead of challenging, instead of refusing, merely reflects. And what does such a specular representation reflect? It reflects the result sought” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 287).

Finally, there is the lived-imagined dimension of time-space, which involves memories, dreams, existential moments of the now and projections towards new spaces and alternative temporalities which do not yet have a material existence. Time as lived is the time of becoming (Heidegger, 1962). It is of being in time rather than time as thought (Bergson, 1911). Lived time involves the permeation of past, present and future, each flowing into each other (Urry, 1995) through irreversible and ceaseless emergence (Adam, 1990) as the present creates what has been and what will be. Imagined space is about social, bodily-lived experience and is revealed through spatial practice. It has practical-planned space as its backdrop,
hence making it a space of domination. Yet, in resemblance to what Turner (1969) refers to as 'liminality', representational space is also a dimension of transition and emancipation - passively experienced until imagination seeks to overcome it by symbolically appropriating and re-appropriating its objects (Lefebvre, 1991). Through guileful ruses and 'textual poaching' (de Certeau, 1984) individuals participate in acts of transgression against dominant order. As absolute and not abstract, lived-imagined time-space is necessarily body-centred, “…for any living body… the most basic places and spatial [-temporal] indicators are first of all qualified by that body” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 174).

These three ways of knowing time-space are engaged by the subject “in whom lived, perceived and conceived (known) come together within spatial [and temporal] practice” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 230). Through this engagement, existing time-spaces are reproduced on the one hand and new time-spaces on the other (Lefebvre, 1991, 2004). Having said this, these three modes of time-space are, however, not to be elided point to point with the three temporal orientations of agency (past-present-future). Rather, these three modes of time-space are best understood as an ongoing dialectic dynamic that influence all 'orientations' of agency. We suggest that in any given circumstances of social action, be it past routine orientated, present orientated or future orientated,

**Table 1: The trialectic of social reproduction**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Temporality</th>
<th>Past</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>Real</td>
<td>Negotiated</td>
<td>Constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Process</td>
<td>Initial conditions</td>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Projected outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Regime</td>
<td>Resource</td>
<td>Cultural Schema</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Routine</td>
<td>Practical-evaluation</td>
<td>Projective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time-space</td>
<td>Practiced</td>
<td>Planned</td>
<td>Imagined</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overarching each of the elements presented in Table 1 is a 'trialectic' of social reproduction. This trialectic is largely based on the crucial temporal orientations of social interaction; the past, the present, and the future. These temporal moments are coupled...
with social processes of initial conditions; interaction, and projected outcomes. These
processes are enacted through routine, practical-evaluative and projective agency. It
is also important to remind again that any given agent-led social process always
actualises in the present. Although the past may be irrevocably 'real' (Archer, 1995), this
past is polysemic and subject to multiple and shifting interpretations, guided by
circumstances in the now, and orientated from their towards the present-past, the
present-present of the present-future, or a combination of each (Mead, 1932). However,
we should note that while they may be polysemic interpretations of the past, these
are largely epistemological in nature -- that is, they are attempts to know the object. During
any given 'combination' of social action, the agent will, depending on the empirical context,
be constrained, influenced or enabled (in the present) by such structures as governance
regimes, resources, and cultural schemas. The interpretation of these social structures
will, again, depending on the context of practice and temporal orientation, be
'coloured' by the intermeshing dynamic of the three time-space modes (again, in the
present). However, despite our contentions that the time-space modes intermesh
invariably, it is anticipated that in any given empirical situation, one mode will probably
dominate over the others. For this reason, and for the sake of clarity in explication, we
have below, assigned each temporal orientation of the trialectic what we believe
would be the governing time-space mode.

The present is the hub of all that is concrete. It is here where emerging patterns of social
process are conditioned by any given combination of social structures and time-
space. In turn, these structures and time-spaces are all subject to interpretation based
on three temporal orientations. The first is the Present-past which involves real initial
conditions and prior patterns of social interaction, with accent placed on repetitive
social interaction in the form of routines, and repetitive iterations of time-space. The
second is the Present-present and involves negotiation of immediate conditions and
emerged patterns of social interaction, with accent placed on practical-evaluation of
planned and apparent conceptions of space-time. The final is the present-future and
involves constructions based on expectations of the future, with accent on lived experience
and/or imaginative projections of time-space.

Before proceeding we need to add a number of caveats to our argument. First, we are not
conceptualising the past as a historian might, albeit history has taught us that the past
endows us with a richness of practical-solutions and imagination. Rather, what we are
arguing is that while the initial conditions of a particular moment of social interaction
may be confronted by actors as a linear succession from the past to the present, they
are nevertheless recreated in the present, that is, reconstructed in the now according
to whatever pressing (structural/spatio-temporal) circumstances the context holds. In
maintaining Archer's realism, the past is real, yet to what extent and how this reality is
reconstructed in the present, is a matter for empirical inquiry. Second, we are not
suggesting that these categories are empirically distinct. Certainly within any
moment of social practice there will be a thick mingling of (spatio-temporal) social
structures, traces of repetition of the past, practical engagements with the present, and
vigor attempts to imagine the future. What we are arguing is that our framework
provides a way of conceptualising and placing social practice into the context of past
social interactions, practical considerations of the present, as well as projections of what is
to come in the future. Finally, we recognise the possibility that other methods of approach
would disagree with the way in which we have described processes of meaning
creation. Literature on narrative, for example, would point out how individuals' present
accounts of action are often disjointed, or completely broken-off from other past or
future narrations of that same context (i.e Ricouer, 1983/84). The power of our
arguments lies, however, in this very objection. Individuals' narrations often seem
disjointed and fragmented because they are discursively or non-discursively re-
constructed in the present, not because they are somehow afloat, undulating in separate
spaces of rationality.

Rhythms of social reproduction

Having amended structuration and suggested a triadic structure involving the interplay between the three-fold model of temporal orientations, agentic processes, social structures and the time-space modes, we would now like to examine the dynamic interaction of these components. We shall argue that each component is part of a continuous temporal cycle of social practice. Moreover this temporal cycle has a certain rhythm. Further, we argue that it is possible to identify a series of general types of rhythms of social reproduction.

In order to develop a conception of the linkages between the components of social reproduction it is important to recognise that it is a temporal process. For Giddens, temporality is the crucial lynchpin of the structuration process. In particular, Giddens conceptualises the structuration process as a singular flow of duration. We certainly concur it is vital to recognise the temporal process which links together the component of structuration. However, this does not go far enough as it collapses various orientations to time into one another. This means it becomes impossible to elucidate the unique features associated with different temporalities. These temporal aspects are what lie behind that action; the moment the action takes place, and what lies ahead. Following what we have argued above, an understanding social practice requires a recognition that it exists within a temporal dynamic of past, present and future. Although we have argued above that each temporal orientation has a notably different ontological character, the temporal process is nevertheless characterised by unceasing flow (Bergson, 1911). This means that the present-present and the present-future is continuously in the process of becoming, flowing irreversibly, like a river stream, from the past, to the present, and then into the state of being the past again (when actualised, the future is always in the present from where it becomes the past). Where this flow gains its form is in the present. In other words, it is the event, which gives flow its particular constitution. Like a stream that gains distinctly new swirls and ripples as it runs through a group of perturbing rocks on a riverbed, social action is given its form in the circumstances of the now. Simply put, “Past, present and future belong to a passage which attains temporal structure through the event...” (Mead, 1932, p. 24).

As a social practice is constructed through the flowing temporal cycle, there is a certain movement and tempo to this flow. This dynamic is marked by the fact that it has a particular rhythm. According to the small social scientific literature on the topic ‘rhythms are recurring patterns of behaviour within a given time frame’ (James, 1988, p. 32), or ‘recurrent cycles in behaviour’ (Warner, 1988, p. 64). In order to specify what we mean by rhythm, we shall draw out some important points from these definitions.

First, although an inherent element in many of our practices, because rhythm is not something we do per se, it easily eludes comprehension. Rather than being a practice by its own, rhythm, as it is understood here, entails patterned sequences of behaviour and at the same time is an experientially cohesive force binding these lesser parts into a larger whole. The idea of rhythm therefore privileges relation over thing (Lefebvre, 2004). Second, rhythm occurs across time and space. As a concrete process and an abstract pattern (Brumbaugh, 1984), rhythmic social practice is constituted by both its flow through past, present and future, and its temporal-relational (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998) positions in space. The third point is that rhythm is a cyclic yet changing dynamic. In other words, it entails patterned sequences of behaviour, which occur again and again. However, in contradistinction to the identically
repetitive structuring cycles in Giddens' structuration theory, within this process of repetition, there is a significant possibility of difference introduced in each 'iteration' (Lefebvre, 2004). Fourth, this recurrence has certain rates (Zerubavel, 1981). In some cases there may be a combination of diverse yet highly regular rhythms. In a social context, these might involve particular skill-sets, or a series of routinised activities (i.e. dancing or cooking). Such regular rhythms are what we might call eurhythmia. This would create a sense of what Goffman (1959) calls temporal normalcy. In other cases, there can highly unstable and unpredictable rhythms. This would create a sense of arrhythmia (Lefebvre, 2004). Finally there may be cases where we are attempting to coordinate ourselves with multiple social rhythms - this is what Lefebvre (2004) calls polyrhythm. Fifth, by virtue that rhythmic recurrence can vary from regularity to disruption, the concept of rhythm involves an existential dimension. Henceforth the common phrases 'being in rhythm' and 'out of rhythm'. Csikzentmihalyi (1988) would relate such phenomena to states of optimum experience, or what he calls 'flow'. However, as a construct, rhythm is more powerful since it not only denotes a particular experience but also derives this experience from a spatio-temporal constitution.

In this sense, the concept of rhythm is useful in depicting the dynamics of the trialectic. Social reproduction, as we have defined it, involves movement and tempo in and through space and time. This movement and tempo will in turn dictate the rhythm of this reproduction. Moreover, in congruence with the trialectic being dominated by one time-space mode, in any given empirical situation, a certain type of rhythm will probably dominate the process of social reproduction as a whole. The most frequent rhythm of social practice encountered are routine rhythms. This involves past rhythms largely repeating themselves in a cyclical fashion. Actors engage in routine agency with a heavy accent on past resources, governing mechanisms and cultural schemas. However, unlike Giddens' view of identical iterations of routine practices, from a rhythmic point of view, every iteration of routine will be somewhat different. That is, during every trialectic cycle of reproduction, ones routines will be re-assessed in light of the past and the future. By necessity then, every iteration will be a part of an emerging and ongoing flow of becoming, related not to a static abstractions but to an equally emergent social world. Among infinite variances of spatio-temporal forces, routine rhythm will be dominated by the action-centred (Schutz, 1971) practical-phenomenal time-space mode.

In other cases where the pressing rhythms of the moment dominate, we will tend to find the dominance of practical rhythms. Such practical rhythms would predominate when sudden and unanticipated factors condition action. This is to say, individuals engage in practical-evaluative agency when there is rupture in structural and spatio-temporal conditions and past routines can no longer adequately deal with the emerged circumstances. Having said this, practical rhythms are perhaps the most unstable and momentary type of rhythm. As soon as the emergent context of action has been negotiated, the adaptive practical rhythm will soon become a routine rhythm. Here, the governing type of time-space is the planned-apparent dimension. There are some cases where the most pressing rhythms are those demanded by the future. In these cases, we find that it is difficult at all to form a rhythm as no pattern can emerge. This works in cases where desired future cognitive schemas dominate, where actors undertake projective agency, and where imagined time-space is dominant. We might call such instances projective rhythms. Like practical rhythms, the projective kind is also unstable and momentary insofar as they seek to adjust towards the unknown and emergent. Finally, there are cases where there are switches between routine rhythms, present-practical rhythms and future-oriented projective rhythms. This is what we might call transitory rhythms. Indeed this case is the most likely instance in most empirical situations. In any
event, it is through each of these modes of rhythm, separately or in combination that we gain a sense of the concrete process and temporal pattern involved in the reproduction of social practices.

Although we have not offered any line of cognitive explanations as to why certain rhythms of social reproduction are chosen over others, it is perhaps useful to remember what it is to be a human organism and to live on earth. Rhythm has long been an object of study in areas ranging from philosophy, biology to psychology. Bachelard (1950) says we are all but a mass of vibrating and rhythmic matter. According to Lefebvre (2004), our very life-worlds are constituted by rhythms, physically, mentally and socially. At a biological level our organisms are said to be locked onto the motions of the earth and the moon; our vital organs, respiration, and even the regeneration of our DNA reverberate to these cycles (Luce, 1973; Young, 1988). In turn, these cosmic and anatomic rhythms help us order our impressions, actions and thoughts (Brown, 1982; Adam, 1995) and dictate fundamental bio-patterns such as sleeping, eating and reproductive (Aschoff, 1965; Naitoh, 1982; Zerubavel, 1981). When our rhythms are disrupted through illness or circumstance, that is, in the case of arrhythmia, we experience instant discomfort. That we share rhythms with our natural environment and that they have such an impact on our physiology and the way we think and behave sheds light on how contextual beings humans really are. It is no leap of faith then to assume that rhythm might have something to do with how we experience social practices, be the context natural or man-made. Having said this, it is suggested that as a tendency, people strive to establish and reproduce rhythmic harmony with the spatio-temporal contexts they engage with. It is here that the above-discussed types of reproductive rhythm become applicable. In any given social occasion, there is the possibility that we will behave in a way somewhat representative of these rhythmic types. Just as Giddens' theorises, one of the main drivers behind purposeful action will always be some form of existential stability. However, unlike Giddens, we suggest that it is not just routine but also practical-evaluative and projective agency (rhythm) through which we negotiate and construct ontological security.

**Discussion and conclusion**

In the course of this paper, we have made the following amendments to structuration theory. First, structuration involves not only the interaction of the pre-existing structural conditions and agential interaction which engages with these conditions, but also a third point which we call projected outcomes. This is to say, by introducing a three-fold typology of social process we reject the duality of structure and agency in favour of the three analytically distinct components of initial social conditions of action (structure), process of interaction (agency), and projected outcomes. In so doing, we introduce a theoretical opening to a binary otherwise incapable of demonstrating social change. Ultimately then, expressing more accurately the recursive character of social life by allowing difference into cycles of reproduction. Moreover, on the basis of this triadic logic, we have been able to transcend Giddens' problematic view of a singular temporal flow associated with the structuring process by incorporating three ontologically distinct temporal orientations, i.e. past as real - present as negotiated - future as constructed. Second, we have argued that social structure should be conceived of as involving actual resources, cultural schemas and regimes of governance. Also, we have made the case that these structures have a prior existence to instances of structuring (Archer, 1992). As such, structures are no longer wholly virtual and suspended 'out of time and space'. Rather, they are deemed as an essential part of societal extension and time-space (re)production. Third, we have argued that agency should be conceptualised as involving routine, practical-evaluative, and projective agency. Closely related to the above arguments, by applying Emirbayer and
Mische's (1998) triad of temporal agency and by adding a future orientated dimension to the already existing forms of discursive (routine/past) and non-discursive (present) agency, we are able to move away from a cognitively reductive and consequently over-socialised view of human action. Also, by arguing for a dynamic, spatio-temporally reproductive society and a strategically forward-looking concept of agency, we revise the principles underlying Giddens' 'ontological security'. In contradistinction to the view that ontological security is only achieved by adapting to a static world through unchanging (past orientated) routine practices, we suggest it to be derived, through (present and future orientated) creative and transformational ability to adjust to a world that is in a state of constant becoming. What is more, by grounding the interpretation of social reproduction in a temporally situated understanding of how and why that action has come to be, we effectively add further depth to Giddens' concepts of reflexive monitoring (purposes and intentions) and motivation (underlying reasons). Fourth, by adding a time-space dimension to the conceptualisation of social structure we demonstrate how structuration does not only occur across time-space but through it. In other words, by 'spatio-temporalising' the object of reproduction, we account for the dynamics of time-space creation. Furthermore, by making this allowance, that is creative subjectivity that produces time and space, we can explain more readily the existence and extension of structures preceding instances of structuration, and also the emergence of wholly new structures.

Together, what these four arguments build towards is a more, reflexive, dynamic and realistic version of structuration. Moreover, underlying each of these amendments is the suggestion that the process of structuration should be approached not as a duality or dualism but as a trialetic. This trialetic involves the interplay between the three-fold model of temporal orientations, agentic processes, social structures and the time-space modes. Social reproduction is interpreted through this trialetic as an ongoing and cyclical flow of becoming. In contradistinction to Giddens' Newtonian abstractions, this flow has spatial and temporal dimensions to it. In other words, it has rhythm. We understand the notion of rhythm to have two sides to it; first, ontologically, it is a relational meta-construct, and second, epistemologically, it has an existential dimension that signifies the extent to which one is in congruence with ones spatio-temporal context. We suggest that in any given empirical context, a certain type of rhythm might dominate. We have discussed four such rhythms (routine rhythms; practical rhythms; projective rhythms, and transitory rhythms), and conclude that they are all in some part essential to understanding how and why certain instances of social reproduction may favour certain rhythmic dispositions over others.

The conception of rhythm presented opens up a number of lines of future study. One important line of research would involve the study of social rhythms and how they reproduce different modes of sociality. The study of rhythmicity in processes of social reproduction can focus on, for example, states of social synchronicity between individuals. This would entail investigating how different spatio-temporal contexts might demand a certain rhythmic disposition from individuals, say, when in working in a team or new organisational department. Another focus could be how certain organisational structures might entrain individuals towards certain patterns of rhythmic behaviour. In turn, a research focus could be how individuals might resist certain structural rhythms through personal imagined rhythms. Another strand of research could investigate the effect context has on routinisation. For example, we may ask how and why do we adapt our routine practices when faced by new circumstances or different surroundings. What are the spatio-temporal qualities of a place, a process or a temporal sequence that influence forms of routinisation? Naturally, one main direction of
research would be the further refinement and empirical application of the 'trialectic' we have introduced. What other types of structure exist out there? What types of spaces and times are we influenced by and haven't yet noticed, or given any recognition to? What aspects of planned or otherwise coercive time-space(s) might we be unreflexive towards, why so, and what might the consequences? Perhaps, this is a more general query but essential nonetheless, how far can we go in 'translating' social structures and agency into spatio-temporal terms? What new can we learn by viewing the taken-for-granted through these largely ignored dimensions?

Because there are few existing studies of rhythm within organizational studies, it may prove difficult to develop methods that can accurately examine this phenomenon. One promising approach to investigating rhythms is what we call the disruption method. Just as one only knows what health is when one becomes ill, so can we reveal the meaning and importance of routine rhythms by breaking them. For example, through 'deprivation' studies where subjects are suddenly deprived of an object, practice or something else essential to existing routines, the abrupt sense of the 'negative', that is, the sudden 'not doing' will accentuate the 'positive', that is, the understanding of what it is to have rhythm. It is also proposed that changes in spatio-temporal constitution of contexts and processes will have a similar effect, albeit, in such an approach, what is disrupted is not the routine itself but its possible conditioners. Be it a 'deprivation' study or manipulation of spatio-temporal context, it is suggested that pre-interviews are conducted so as to establish an understanding of informants' initial dispositions and beliefs. Participant observation, if possible, is recommended for the period of disruption. If not feasible, ethnographic data can be collected in forms of informant-diaries, and audiovisual data, such as photographs and video. These materials can help nurture narratives of rhythm through autodriving sessions. The study of practical-evaluative agency and its defining rhythm(s) will be closely related to the above approach. This is for the reason that practical rhythms are often negotiated in light of past routine rhythms (and future projections too). However, as mentioned earlier, practical rhythms are unstable and momentary and therefore not to be approached through 'disruption'. Rather, they should be investigated as forms of practice-based, temporally situated, negotiations of creativity. In addition to participant observation, semi-structured or open-ended interviews on the negotiation of practical rhythms could be coupled with structural or topographical analysis of possible constraints and/or enablers.

In accordance to the principles of the trialectic, projective rhythms are guided by constructions based on past and present circumstances and anticipations of the future. For this reason, they should be studied in the same fashion as practical rhythms. Interviews that focus on future plans and desires can be embedded in the wider context of structural conditions, past and present motivations and ambitions. In the case of transitory rhythms, or actual events where all the above rhythm types may be present, shifting and switching in flows of social reproduction, one recommended method is that of biographical interviewing, or what is know as 'life history' interviewing (see Denzin, 1989). The central focus, here, would be the temporal structures present in narrative plots, and how through their stories, informants might ascribe meaning to present practices in light of the past, the present and the future (see McAdams, 1996; Ricouer, 1983/4).

References


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