Friendship as a Way of Living: Deconstruction and Quantum Storytelling

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Abstract
This article explores Jacques Derrida’s notion of friendship and extends towards a quantum understanding of friendship derived from an ethics of mattering (Barad, 2007). It inscribes itself into an uncommon vocabulary in the organization and management literature. Yet we believe that the notion of friendship is a crucial dimension of organizations but none-the-less is often not recognized here.

INTRODUCTION

Derrida begins his exploration of friendship with a statement attributed to Aristotle. The statement goes like this ‘O my friends, there is no friend’ (Derrida, 1993, p. 353). This article will follow Derrida and deconstruct and resituate the hegemonic relationship of friend/enemy and develop another notion of friendship based on infinite alterity (ibid, p. 366), and which can be formulated like this: ‘I have no enemies, everyone is my friend’. With this statement we invite you to regard friendship as a way of living and to avoid being caught up in dichotomies of friend/enemy, peace/war etc.

Our approach is guided by living story (Jørgensen & Boje, 2001), which is linked to Derrida’s notion of story but also to Bakhtin’s term ‘the unique once-occurrent being-as-event’ (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 2). Friendship as an attitude to life is about being-there, in the spontaneous moment of becoming. It implies the recognition of difference, multiplicity as well as lived experience in the moment of becoming. Friendship is about suspending of our immediate inclination to judgment embedded and embodied in theories, narratives, bodies, spatial and material arrangements and expose ourselves to the plural forces of the moment.
As such friendship is antenarrative (Boje, 2001) in exploring many possible futures and in creating new beginnings. Derrida’s notion of friendship invites us to go deeper and explore the emerging living stories in the here-and-now moment of becoming and appreciate the unique radical beingness of our selves and others. Derrida’s notion Politics of Friendship (1993) thus describes an altogether ‘friendly’ endeavor. It revives the art of storytelling as an authentic, natural, spontaneous and locally anchored practice full of compassion and companionship; a mode of being-together which is lost in modern rationalistic modes of communication (Benjamin, 1999).

The quantum understanding of friendship is used to qualify the politics of friendship by embedding politics not only in discourse but also in spatial and material arrangements. It is an attempt to de-romanticize our approach by emphasizing the complexities involved in friendship in the sense that the material-discursive apparatuses that we are part of create the conditions and possibilities of connections but also separations and as such can jeopardize even the most closest friendships.

Further, it implies taking us beyond the human and discursive domain and instead recognize the entanglement and connectedness of human and non-human agents and thus where our care, hospitality and friendship is directed not only to humans but to the world including nature, animals, artifacts and the material-discursive practices that we are engaged in.

We organize the article as follows. First, we explore the statement ‘O my friends, there is no friend’ by deconstructing the stories of friendship that follows from this statement. The stories that we deconstruct are some of our personal experiences from Academia in very different historical, geographical and material contexts.

Second, we move beyond this statement towards the other statement ‘I have no enemies, everyone is my friend’. Again we illuminate these stories by personal experiences from Academia. In this section we also argue how a storytelling approach makes such a statement comprehensible and meaningful.

Third, we extend Derrida’s position towards a quantum-material understanding of friendship and what this implies in terms of thinking about friendship.

Fourth, we conclude on our findings.

‘O MY FRIENDS, THERE IS NO FRIEND’

In his essay on ‘Politics of Friendship’, Jacques Derrida refers to the beautiful sayings of the philosopher told by Diogenes Laertius. One of them answers the question ‘what is a friend?’ this way: ‘A single soul and two bodies’ (Derrida, 1993, p. 359). Further Derrida notes about Aristotle’s position here that in friendship it is more appropriate to love than being loved (Derrida, 1993, p. 354). According to Derrida, this however complicates the ‘mutualist’ and ‘reciprocalist’ schema privileged by Aristotle elsewhere (ibid).

Derrida concludes that Aristotle’s notion of friendship is based on sameness and is a fraternal relation in a brotherhood of men. In friendship you love the ones who are the same you, which implies self-love. It complicates the idea of loving instead of being loved, which seems to say something else; namely to love somebody, who is different from you. This idea of friendship as one soul and two bodies is an example of being friends with people, who are the same as you. It requires a sense of belonging and socialization to a group, an organization or a particular nation. At the other extreme we have the enemy; those people who are very different from you.

As we shall argue below, Derrida believes that there are certain kinds of politics involved in this kind of friendship. You are supposed to follow the norms and conventions of the group in order to be a member. You have to play by the rules of the games. In academia it means playing according to the games of truth and their materializations in the ways you do research, the ways you teach, go to conferences, listen to the experts, the professors, editors, write in particular ways, use particular methodologies and so on (e.g. Pritchard, Jones & Stablein, 2004).

With these practices comes a hierarchy of institutions, journals and positions that serves as a kind of measuring rod for how important you are. The apparatuses of research govern the steps you have to take in order to be somebody in this ‘distinguished’ and ‘honorable’ institution.
I learned a valuable lesson, ‘O my friends, there is no friends’ in academia. When I was a newly minted assistant professor at UCLA’s Anderson School of Management, when I attended conferences, lots of people came up to talk to me, say ‘hello’ and said “I read your article.” Leaving UCLA, I realized who my friends were. The ones who helped me pack out my office, the rejected articles lining both sides of the hallway.

Being the first born to of my family tree to ever attend college, much less get a Ph.D. I thought, ‘well that’s it’, there is no jobs for me in Academia. I start a business with some ‘friends’ from church. I learned my second valuable lesson; never starts a business with friends, especially from church. Their interests change, and you are left with the work, and the bills. Friends share secrets, but not so with these particular church friends. One was a sexist woman hater, which meant that wives or any other female could not do more than pour coffee.

The other, well, let’s just say, they put their location on maps, so you know to keep your children away. With these kinds of friends, who needs enemies? I left business and went for an interview, at Loyola Marymount University, and got a job as a visiting professor, to fill in for someone on sabbatical for one semester. At a cocktail party with some UCLA folks, these ‘friends’ told me, “you will not get tenure there either, it’s a teaching university and you are a researcher, not a teacher.”

So I took some classes in calligraphy, in-order-to learn about visual focus, and some aesthetics I could use with my storytelling. I also decided, that this time, if I failed, it would be because I was teaching and researching what I love best, storytelling. By the end of the term, I was teacher of the year for the University and for the Business College. After subbing for another sabbatical, and getting yet more teaching awards, they put me on tenure track.

Let’s back up a little. Once I did not get tenure and showed up at these same conferences with a nametag that read, “Loyola Marymount University” these same people did not know me, did not read me. I learned that in academia it’s what is written on your nametags that determine your friends. Bob Dennehy is an exception. We are at an Organizational Behavior Teaching Conference (OBTC). We are being left alone, to contemplate the relation of friends and Academy nametags.

We began to play with the sessions, moving from one to the next, taking foreign visitors to the conference, equally ignored, and crashing other sessions. For example, a fellow named Dag traveled all the way from Sweden to do his presentation, and there was no one in attendance. So Bob and I, grabbed Dag by the hand and walked him into another session, “you don’t mind if Dag crashes, he traveled from Sweden, after all?” The sessions were gracious about it.

This led me to doing something postmodern. I vowed then and there, to never take Academy nametag watchers seriously. So at Academy of Management conferences, I began to provoke, disrupt and crash not only sessions, but dinners, and other conferences. Bob and I, for example, crashed a Popular Culture Conference, and a Native American Powwow while attending Management Academy conferences. This gave us perspective, such as the editor of a popular culture journal, declaring, he would not accept anymore article submissions on ‘backyard art.’

All the faculty and doctoral students took note, many jotting it down word-for-word. When we attended the Academy’s editor’s session, we heard pretty much the same proclamation, “we won’t be accepting any more articles on population ecology.” Our games got more outlandish. I would sometimes toss the paper handouts up the middle aisle, or in protest against Nike’s sweatshop, lecture while barefoot.

Grace Ann and I began graffiting nametags, putting on labels of fruits and vegetables, of sayings, such as ‘be postmodern.’ Then there were the buttons. We would distribute ‘dancing is postmodern’ buttons after the Academy banned dancing (along with a storybook of different versions of why not). There was the very popular button, “Harleys are postmodern” when Richard Teerlink, VP of Harley-Davidson was the keynote at Academy of Management. I did a lot of theatrics, even dressing up as Ronald McDonald, and doing to Boalian Theatre of the Oppressed. Some were not amused.

An assistant professor, “David, I cannot be seen talking to you, I am on the job market.” “David, I cannot wear that button, I am an Academy Board member.” “These days you call this viral marketing. It is a way to get topics that were initially new and different, into mainstreams, by forming a conference within a conference. The graffiti was a marker designating an affinity group, not necessarily friends, but people open to a particular discourse.

Later as a professor at New Mexico State University, the nametag game was only marginally better. There came a time for Grace Ann and I to host OBTC at NMSU. We decided to not put university affiliation or rank on the nametags. Colleagues who called themselves friends came up to me, “David, how do I know who this is, and how to talk to them?” That is the point, good buddy.

Let’s go back to the time at Loyola Marymount University, away at a conference, when I first met Grace Ann, she was in a food line. I overheard her say she would only date vegetarians. I said, “I am a
vegetarian. I said, “I’m vegetarian, what looks good here.” I had never been vegetarian before, and was not sure just what it meant to be one. Yet, from that moment forward, I have been vegetarian. Grace Ann took me to meet her Jainism guru, Gurudev Shree Chitrabhanu.

Grace Ann already had a Jain name, Arihanta. If Gurudev wanted to, he could give me my Jain name. He meditated, and then said, “David your Jain name will be Arihanta.” I heard him say, “Arihunta means conqueror of your inner enemies. Meditation on it daily.” I did as instructed for ten years. I found I had many inner enemies, and the more I rooted them out, the more I still had. I did some study of the word, “Arihunta”:

“The word Arihanta is made up of two words: 1) Ari, meaning enemies, and 2) hanta, meaning destroyer. Therefore, Arihanta means a destroyer of the enemies. These enemies are not people like you, me, or any animal, or plant, etc. These enemies are inner desires known as passions. These includes anger, ego, deception, and greed. These are the internal enemies within us” (Jainworld.com).

In Janinism (and Buddhism) Arihuntas, means destroyer of inner enemies like anger, ego, deception, greed, etc.

Bakhtin uses the metaphor of the carnival to denote instances and places, which allowed for new innovative language to emerge and in which it was legitimate to subject the establishment to parody, mockery and laughter. This kind of feast was very different and spontaneous from the official feast that asserts all that was stable, unchanging and perennial (Bakthin, 1994, p. 199).

David and his friends practiced some ‘carnivalesque storytelling’ distracting, disturbing and resisting the establishment and its ways of governing friendships in Academia. The only difference is though that the carnival was not always considered legitimate here. In any case the stories tell about the ways Academia works including some of the established practices of producing friendships and enemies. The academic communities are highly political. These are material-discursive contexts (e.g. Barad, 2007) governed by certain apparatuses that work to configure that we perform according to some higher purposes and truth defined by academic traditions and conventions.

These influence how people do things together, how they connect with other people, how they separate them off from other people; in short there are mechanisms of inclusion/exclusion, membership/non-membership. Results are sealed-off academic communities in a war with one another. In the science wars not only the truth is at stake – maybe it has very little to do with truth. Positions, resources and relationships are also at stake. They don’t take place at the level of discourse alone. They can be very violent and have serious material consequences like losing a job, being expelled, marginalized or stigmatized.

They are conditioned on the governmentality of the state (Dean, 2008; Foucault, 2003) but also on the knowledge, values and attitudes of different professions. As such particular relations of power that govern notions of truth, access to positions, possibilities and resources often govern friendship in Academia. They govern the possibilities of publishing, of getting research funding, getting tenure and to get the positions where your voices are most likely to be heard; and apart from that it is also a place where you have to make a living.

I (2nd author) also learned some valuable lessons from my years in academia. Today, 16 years after I started my PhD, I am professor. I have been working in three different departments and with people from different faculties. When I had my inaugural lecture in the beginning of 2013 I thanked those people, who have helped me so far on my ‘unfinished’ journey. However, there were certain people that were not mentioned that day and remained in the dark of my story. Those people were also important and I owe them a great deal for finding my way in Academia. The strange thing is that these people actually offered their friendship to me but in a way in which I felt I was to erase my own history and personality in order to become like them.

They insisted on sameness instead of difference so in that sense friendship for them was based alignment with the current power/knowledge structure in the group/community.

It was from a time where I felt the raging of ‘the science wars’ on my own body. I felt that when I did my PhD in a business department. I found out that they preferred particular kinds of knowledge such as economic and statistical knowledge, while my training was in management and organization theory and in qualitative methods. I could feel this difference even if they emphasized how important it was to be interdisciplinary and open-minded. Qualitative methods were accepted but still the hierarchy of
knowledge and the hierarchy of people – formal or informal – was governed by knowledge of a more positivist kind including a particular theorization of economics. In order to be a ‘true’ friend and to be somebody I was expected to partially reject my former thinking and convert. This was not easy and I did not do well. Two months after I had begun my Ph.D. one of my colleagues actually called me in for a meeting. When I came in, we talked a little bit about the future. He mentioned a case where a woman had finished a Ph.D. and had not been able to find a job afterwards. Based on this he said that doing a Ph.D. was probably not the wisest thing to do, if I took into consideration my career opportunities afterwards. My interpretation of the situation was that he gave me a very ‘friendly’ advice – to quit.

I didn’t follow his advice but decided to stay. I tried to become a member by always trying to relate my own thinking to the dominating mind frames – without any success. I also studied a lot of the articles and working papers produced within that particular field. One evening I was reading an article and I was struggling to understand this strange vocabulary. At one point I went to take a good look at myself in the mirror. I said to myself that this was simply ridiculous. So I took the article and threw it away. No more of this. Let’s do what I find interesting instead of trying to be somebody that I wasn’t. The situation was a decisive turning point where I finally rejected the vision of being part of the group. In a way I rejected their friendship and the conditions on which this proposal was based. I remained a stranger, one that really could not fit in, an unimportant person, who was just passing by and would leave when the Ph.D. money ran out.

I had good support from my supervisor, a Marxist. I think he encouraged me a lot to follow my own way for ideological reasons and he was very happy when I introduced Foucault in my study. I also managed to find friends outside of the research group, who also encouraged me but who was also outside the dominant thinking and had had their hard times in the university. One of them is one of my close friends now. He became and still is my ‘brother in arms’ and a continuous supporter and friend. The other one was my former supervisor on my master thesis and he also got involved when I was doing my PhD. They also helped me to find another job in the university. I hoped for better times because it was not nice being lonely and feeling like a stranger. It was my friend, who got me in contact with a professor in another department. Initially this professor was so thrilled to have hired me and he also offered his friendship. He asked if I would join a new research center, which was supposed to do action research. I thought that was very interesting because it was a new way of thinking about partnerships among companies and the university.

But soon problems emerged in our collaboration. Some of the problems were related to a method called the actor method, where we worked with people in organizations through dialogues. My friend had asked me to be part of his project. I also had found a company, which was willing to become part of an action research project where we could experiment with the methods. That was not good enough. In one meeting the professor made it clear to me that he didn’t like my perspective on things; in particular he didn’t like that I had been working with Foucault’s methods in my Ph.D, and he didn’t like that I was working with the actor method. I should talk to the science expert in the center, who had just been hired from abroad. In order to resolve the conflicts we decided to keep in close contact for the next couple of months so that we could obtain a shared understanding of how we thought about things. We also did something in our project group working with the actor method. We decided to erase the word actor. Another professor in the center had almost threatened one of the Ph.D. students in the project. He had asked him in a very angry way: “Is this project about the actor method?”

But of course it didn’t work out. What was asked of me was to convert and do things their way. I couldn’t give up my soul and I decided to tell the professor that I couldn’t work this way. Before this meeting, I made a report, which summarized what I had been working this first year of my contract. The report documented that I probably had been one the most productive of all employees in the center.

It did not make a lasting impression because the professor had decided to get rid of me, so he didn’t want to renew my contract. In another meeting, the professor and the foreign science expert in science concluded that I was fired because of an inability to adapt. I was a controversial and dangerous person to talk to; someone who couldn’t listen to reason but had been lost in postmodern fundamentalism.

The second author’s stories are from the early period in his career, where he was a junior researcher. He was not an activist, but was more like a ‘silent’ rebel in his way of theorizing and working in Academia. His case is interesting seen from Derrida’s argument that ‘O my friends’ requires some degree of shared language and stories (see below). There was hardly any such thing. So who could he call and who would have listened if we imagine that he had said ‘O my friends’? Only a very few people and they were all outside the dominant thinking.
Stigma, marginalization, mocking, loneliness etc. come together with hard material factors like losing a job, uneasy access to resources and also losing people that we actually thought were friends. That was the curse that we had to live with and live through. Do we complain about that? No! After all Nietzsche said ‘what does not kill us makes us stronger’ and further innovation – also in Academia – is always controversial because it inevitably interferes and disturbs the power relations that govern such communities.

But our experience also tells us that the dynamics, which governed friendship in these communities, will take us nowhere in the sense that it limits our freedom to speak, to do research and to live in the first place. True, power is productive (Foucault 1979) but this kind of production of knowledge that we have often experienced in Academia has as its main purpose the domination of only very selective kinds of truths and as such it cannot do much good for human kind.

Further, friendships do emerge in these fields but it is friendships that are based on very selective criteria and the adoption of a particular material-discursive practice (e.g. Barad, 2007, see later in the article). Instead we have to work with a different attitude towards friendship where we have to learn to love the people who are different from us. Or at least we have to try to love them to establish sound relations with them even if a close friendship might not emerge because that is something that cannot be guaranteed, controlled or governed.

We believe that Derrida is very helpful for establishing this attitude and we will elaborate on it in the next section.

‘I have no enemies, everyone is my friend’

First, however, we will delve a little but more with the question ‘what is friendship?’ Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben has written a small essay ‘What is a Friend?’ initiated by some controversy about the statement ‘O my friends, there is no friend’ (ibid, p. 353). According to Agamben, the correct translation would be ‘He who has (many friends), does not have a single friend (2009, p. 27), which according to Agamben makes more sense and also dissolves the dilemma invoked by the sentence ‘O my friends, there is no friend’.

Further, Agamben claims that friendship is nothing other than ‘… a proximity that resists both representation and conceptualization. To recognize someone as a friend means not being able to recognize him as “something” … friendship is neither a property nor a quality of a subject (ibid, p. 31). As such we cannot talk about our friends as having particular properties or qualities. We know them as our friends because they are our friends; that’s it.

Friends do not share something other than the experience of friendship (ibid, p. 36). Friendship precedes every division because what is shared is life itself. ‘One must therefore also “con-sent” that this friend exists and this happens by living together and by sharing acts and thoughts in common’ (ibid, p. 33).

Accordingly friendship cannot be defined and it cannot be talked about in any ordinary scientific essentialist way and if we did, it could probably jeopardize our friendships. Friendship is first and foremost something that is felt – a genuine attachment, sympathy and compassion among people. And therefore it is probably very difficult to have many close friends as suggested by the statement ‘He who has many friends, does not have a single friend.

As human beings we are in a state of continuous diffraction as we become entangled with many different people at different points in time and in different material-discursive circumstances (see later in the article). We share different things with people according to where we are in our life. Our academic relationships are based on something else than our private relationships because the stories, traditions and activities are different.

Some of these relationships develop into close friendships; others into mere acquaintances. Why this difference? That is awfully difficult to explain and as noted above we shouldn’t think too much about why we connect or disconnect with some people. So when we state make the statement ‘I have no enemies, everyone is my friend’ we do not describe an actual state of affairs. We do not even believe that this should be so because it would probably mean that we wouldn’t have any friends (e.g. the statement ‘he who has many friends, does not have a single friend).

Instead it describes an attitude to life and to the people that we somehow and for some reason become connected to in our lives. Friendship is love of life instead of being guided by a desire to dominate, by fear or by treating others with mistrust. It is an alternative to much current management thinking based on control and governance, and which is destructive of life. Friendship is a storyteller’s attitude to life in despite of all the ‘b…shit’ that we are sometimes
subjected to in our lives, including our academic lives. Therefore it is a way of life that contains positive energies and vibrations instead of destructive energies.

It is here we think that Derrida’s writings on friendship is helpful because at the outset it contains this loving relationship to other people. However the political plays a major role here in the sense that he argues that friendship is based on a politics of sameness. He teaches us that our notions of friendship are not independent on the contexts in which we live our lives (Derrida, 1993).

What he has in mind is to have us question the politics of friendship and have us recognize that our notions of friendship – and thus also our friendly relations – are based on politics, which favor particular people, while others are excluded from the sphere of friendship. He for example argues that the literature on friendship has been phallogocentric (ibid, p. 382). But in addition our everyday notions of friendship are also entangled with such aspects of work, race, religion, gender, generation, class, political conviction, region and nation-state and other important dimensions etc., which we use to differentiate between those who are considered our friends and those who are not.

‘Politics of friendship’ is an invitation to explore and reconsider how we relate to the world, and where we are urged to consider how we configure the difference between friends/enemies, us/them etc. In his discussion of ‘O my friends, there is no friend’, he is trying to overcome the dichotomies of friendship/enemy, which he thinks has dominated the literature on friendship since the Greeks.

The purpose of Derrida’s writings on friendship is then not to re-conceptualize or re-define friendship as a particular property or quality of men but this questioning as we mentioned before. In other words, we not intend to jeopardize our friendships by reflecting on why they are our friends thereby defining them as having particular properties or qualities. They are our friends because they are our friends. The points is though that we have to work with our selves and try to extend our care, friendship and responsibility to those who are different from us.

We believe that this is what Derrida has in mind when he talks about reconsidering friendship on the basis of infinite alterity, which he has from Levinas (see later). Here he also talks about an excessive assignation of responsibility (Derrida, 1993, p. 366). He argues that we are invested with an undeniable responsibility the moment we begin to talk and act (ibid, p. 365). We are caught up in responsibility, which is assigned to us by the other and from the other. This responsibility comes before autonomy and must therefore also exceed it, succeed it, survive it and indefinitely overrun it. In other words, we cannot deny our responsibility by claiming autonomy.

Before everything else, we are responsible. What has this got to do with friendship? That cannot be answered in any definite sense because before knowing what friendship is we should first deal with a certain use of the word ‘friendship’ (Derrida, 1993, p. 366). We are speaking within a specific tradition of what friendship means within a given culture and these traditions are by no means homogeneous (ibid). The notion of ‘O my friend’ before the comma presupposes friendship. Someone is turning towards his friends, which means that there must be friends in order to address people in this way (ibid, p. 367).

In this sense the plea ‘O my friends’ turns towards the past because it could not be understood otherwise. It requires that minimal friendship and consent have already been shown because no one would otherwise listen to the call or be sensitive to it (ibid, p. 367). According to Derrida, friendship thus requires some degree of shared language of friendship or speaking within the horizon of the same language. Turning back to the statement ‘O my friends, there is no friend’ he says that this shared language is a kind of a contract; a friendship prior to friendship (ibid, p. 367).

On the other hand friendship is not something that exist in the moment of becoming because how could I give you my friendship, where friendship would not be lacking (ibid, p. 368). The second part of the statement, ‘there is no friend,’ is thus directed towards the future. But precisely because of that let us make it so that there will be friendships. ‘Here is what I am calling to you, answer me, it is our responsibility’ (ibid, p. 368).

It tells us that friendship cannot be taken for granted. It is never given in the present. Instead ‘…it belongs to the experience of waiting, of promise or of engagement. Its discourse is that of prayer; and at stake here is what responsibility opens to the future” (ibid, p. 368).
After ten years, I (1st author) returned to New York to see Gurudev. “Gurudev, I want a new name. I have been meditating on Arihunta for ten years, and would like a different name.” He looked at me puzzled, “Arihunta is a good name for you. Why do you want a different one?” I replied, “I meditate on my inner enemies, and I have found quite a few, and have talked about them to my coach, and worked on rooting them out.

He said, “David, Arihunta does not mean, conquer your inner enemies, in Sanskrit, it means, ‘you have no enemies, everyone is your friend’.” How could I have meditated for ten years on the wrong meaning? Perhaps it is how I heard it, and I needed to go through that meditation. Who was I to disagree? Gurudev is the leader of one of the largest Jainism movements in the world. If he says “David, you have no enemies, everyone is your friend” who am I to disagree.

He gave me a silver coin, with Sanskrit messages about being vegetarian, compassion for all beings (animal and plant included), and meditation. My meditation became quite different. How could I be a critical theorists, a critical postmodernist, deconstructing everything, and have no enemies? Isn’t Nike an enemy? What about McDonald’s, Wal-Mart, Monsanto, Enron? Then I got it. There are great people and some lousy people in each of these corporations. Some people are trying to do the right thing, other are just doing anything to exploit.

A conference within a conference. When Academy of Management rejected a submission that had all 5’s (top of the scale of excellence), I decided to join another conference, the International Academy of Business Disciplines (IABD). I invited only friends, defined as, people who had never stabbed me in the back, to the postmodern organization theory (POT) division of IABD. We renamed it Critical Postmodern OT, for obvious reasons. After about ten years, I was elected to the board, and a couple years later, was elected as president of IABD.

However, the year I took office, I got another lesson in friends and enemies. After dressing as Ronald McDonald and doing a theatre of the oppressed, “McDonald’s goes to Iraq” in protest of the war, I was called on the carpet, before the Board of IABD, and asked to resign. “Presidents should not dress as Ronald McDonald.” I said, “No, if you want me, you hold an election.” The next day, after some bully yelled at two doctoral students in our division, I was called on the carpet again, “you cannot be doing this, please resign.”

At the end of the conference meetings, an announcement was made, that I was no longer president. I learned who my true friends were. Two board members confided, dressing up as Ronald McDonald, and confronting the bully had nothing to do with my beheading. A powerful person in IABD, not even on the board, had been lobbying all the board members, for the past year, since I was elected, and enough board members decided to use just any excuse whatever, as a cover story. The CPOT division and two others met and decided to quit IABD and form our own conference. We named it Standing Conference for Management and Organization Inquiry (so the deans would pay for travel), and for us, we used the initials, which sound French, ‘sc’Moi’ (c’est moi, see http://scmoi.org for the history).

‘I have no enemies, everyone is my friend’ is the storyteller’s response to these unfriendly academic environments. As such storytelling implies both an ethics of responsibility and is at the same time a resistant force to extant hegemonies in the modern apparatuses of production that also increasingly govern academy as well as other social spaces. The point is here that storytelling is not just only about how we story meaning in our lives and about how the matters of the world are personalized, interiorized and exteriorized (e.g. Arendt, 1958, p. 50).

The point is that storytelling at the outset is ethical. It should not be mistaken though, because you can ask ‘what is ethical then?’ without us being able to identify what it is. The point is different and says that due to the nature of storytelling we are compelled to extend our hospitality and friendship towards the world and embrace both human and non-human agents in their radical difference. This is our responsibility because otherwise we would give in to the disasters of management rationalities that run through our governance systems in today’s scientific world.

To start the argument, we may look at Benjamin’s classical essay The storyteller (1999), which is at once a beautiful tribute to the art of storytelling and a dark critical essay on modernity’s brutal destruction of it as noted by Jørgensen, Klee & Canal (2014). The storyteller is in our view an essay on the clash between modern rationality and ethics. Benjamin locates storytelling in the milieu of craftsmen (Benjamin 1999, p. 100) and describes it as an artisan form of communication (ibid, 91), which is important for sharing experiences and constitutes a genuine practice.

In artisan storytelling people do not exchange impersonal, non-emotional and de-contextual information; they share experiences. ‘A man listening to a story is in the company of the storyteller, even a man reading one shares this companionship’ (ibid, p. 99). The relationship is in other words compassionate and devoid of capital and politics. A
good relationship between a teller and a listener is a friendly relation where people become genuinely engaged and absorbed in the moment as the story unfolds.

A storyteller ‘…has counsel for his readers’ (ibid, p. 86); counsel which is woven into the fabric of everyday life (ibid, 86). Storytelling is thus the means of the oppressed against totalitarian rational language (Tally, 2001, p. 13) and further the storyteller is the figure in which the righteous man encounters himself (Benjamin, 1999, p. 107). On the other hand this notion of a relationship devoid of capital and politics seems very far away from Derrida’s insistence on politics of friendship – but then again his politics of friendship is inherently friendly, as we shall argue below.

Derrida’s position on ethics cannot be understood without taking into account Levinas and his notion of radical Otherness. Jones, Parker and Ten Bos (2005, pp. 75-76) argue, following Levinas, that we can choose to treat people in four different ways: (1) we can treat them as an object that can be manipulated with from our desire; (2) we can treat them as if they are the same as us; (3) we can treat them as an average of a group of people, or (4) we can try to approach them as someone, who are radical different from me.

Wild argues in his introduction to Totality and Infinity (Levinas, 1991) that there is a strong tendency in human beings and groups to maintain an egocentric attitude and treat people as extensions of self or as objects that can be manipulated with (Wild 1991, p. 13). Neither of them do justice to the original experience of the other person (ibid, p. 12). It is this understanding of the person as one, who is radically different from me that constitutes ethics in Levinas’ opinion. It forces us to open up and experience the difference of the Other. It is also here that we may learn something different about others but also of ourselves.

In his presentation of his position, Levinas opposes this position with that of war, which in his opinion suspends morality. This kind of violence is not so much about injuring and killing people as it is about having them to play roles in which they do not any longer recognize themselves and instead betrays commitments and their own substance (Levinas, 1991, p. 21). That visage of being that is disclosed in war is the concept of totality (ibid, p. 21) that also dominates philosophy, management and leadership thinking and the governance of our academic communities.

The concept of totality implies in Levinas words that ‘…the unicity of each present is incessantly sacrificed to a future appealed to bring forth its objective meaning. For the ultimate meaning alone counts’ (ibid, p. 22). What is sacrificed is the possibility of the experience of the Other in his/her radical difference in favor of the imposition of the I – and totality – onto the other.

The attempt to think ethics from the radical difference of the Other has consequences for how we think about friendship. Rather than thinking about friendship as one soul and two bodies – a position that is inherently fixed - the notion of Otherness would imply a welcoming of a stranger, that is meeting a stranger with friendly intent, with hospitality and openness. It is a loving approach where we actively contemplate the Other as a being, which counts as such.

This implies the attempt to overcome yourself, which Levinas speaks of as containing more than one’s capacity. Containing more than one’s capacity does not mean embracing or encompassing the totality of being but means ‘…to shatter at every moment the framework of a content that is thought, to cross the barriers of immanence’ (Levinas, 1991, p. 27). This welcoming of the Other takes place through language and conversation because it is through these means that a community is to be achieved.

It means that we must be ready to put our worlds into worlds and offer it to the other as an act of generosity and sharing despite all dubious assumptions and arbitrary features (Wild, 1991, p. 14) despite the dangers that this giving and loving attitude may be rejected and abused by the Other and despite the fears that our friendly intent may be understood. In Violence and Metaphysics (2002), Derrida deconstructs Levinas’ ethical position but also contemplates Levinas’ ethics.

As noted by us (Jørgensen & Boje, 2010, p. 255), Derrida rejects Levinas idea of the exteriority of the other because it is presumes what Derrida calls the naked face; a face beyond and independent of language; a dream of pure thought so to speak. And this is where he diverges from Levinas’ position. Derrida argues instead that we cannot escape language, we cannot escape discourse, we cannot escape culture and we cannot escape power. Relations of power are embedded in in language, in speech, in traditions, in cultures, in gestures and so forth (Jørgensen, 2007).
And actually we shouldn’t avoid power because a speech without violence would say nothing to the other. As such Levinas’ idea that all violence can be disquieted and disarmed is problematic according to Derrida (ibid, p. 255) because we are bounded by our languages and practices when we engage with another person. This is what Derrida has in mind when he talks about that the plea ‘O my friends’ turns towards the past but cannot be understood without a minimum of consent and friendship because otherwise no one would be able to understand the plea and react to the plea.

Because of that friendship is contextual and is itself embedded in relations of power. So a speech without violence is a utopia. What is important is instead how we work with ourselves and how we relate to other people and to the world. We are in a continuous state of diffraction (Barad, 2007, see below). We have been and are continuously created as an entangled state of multiple human and non-human forces, which means that the conception of the other or even of the Other is infused with ourselves.

To work with ourselves will not disarm power and totality as such but we can become more aware of ourselves as bearers of particular forces and then maybe broaden our notions of, who the others are, to see how we affect the others and how we then implicitly configure who we see as our friends while we marginalize others from our friendship. Based on that we may be able to create new friendships based on difference rather than sameness.

Is a friendship that is based not on the dichotomies friends/enemy, peace/war; rather this friendship only makes sense because it carries within it the possibility of enmity and war within the same relationship. But that is exactly why we have to work carefully with how we build relations in the world. Our notion of living story (Jørgensen & Boje, 2010, p. 257) as a spontaneous unfolding in the here-and-now moment is an invitation to do just that.

It is built on Derrida’s notion of story, which according to him has no borderlines. It is at once larger and smaller than itself, is entangled in a play with other stories and remains utterly different from its homonym narrative (Derrida, 2004, p. 82). It is living in the sense of becoming, it is not finished but alive in the here and now (Jørgensen & Boje, 2010, p. 257). It is emotional, spontaneous, plural and emergent in the moment of becoming.

When applied to friendship it means being present – in the spontaneous moment of becoming – and explore the moment before we bury it in narrative meaning and give way to our inclinations to domination and judgment. We have to explore the living stories of others and when we do that we also explore ourselves and our own taken-for-granted assumptions.

Friendship as a way of living means exposing yourself to the plural forces of the moment and explore the living stories that are part of it in order to overcome yourself and in order to create the possibility of friendship with others.

When I (2nd author) in January 2013 had my inaugural lecture there were some people giving a speech for me. One was the dean of the social sciences who said something about that I was a very empathetic and easy to work with. She also said that she had the impression that I was actually living the way that I theorized about leadership and management – taking the consequences of it in being a colleague and in being a teacher. A member of the research group on sustainable leadership also held a speech where he talked about my recent interest in friendship and he said that people had asked about why I was interested in friendship. His reply was that maybe it was because I was a very friendly person.

Another close friend of mine held a speech, where she said that one of the best things about me was that I was open-minded and also supported people, who was working with untraditional ideas. I felt very proud about those speeches because in some sense they captured some things that are and have been important for me. These personal qualities were very important for me. And it was some change from the stories about me from when I was fired and marginalized from the university back in 2000.

In 2001, I had begun working at the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research on Learning, now the Department of Learning and Philosophy. What a change it was in my academic life because I was almost immediately felt accepted for how I did my and theorized my research. I was not a postmodern fundamentalist anymore, although at some points I did hear rumors that some people from the outside of the center said that I sometimes had a hard time listening to others’ and more experienced peoples’ advice. Maybe so, I don’t know.

It was also at the center that I began to teach for the first time in my academic career. How nervous I was when I entered the lecture room for the first time, but people were very helpful and supportive. In 2007 I went to see David in New Mexico and stayed for almost seven weeks. I was again nervous and didn’t
know what to expect. But my family and I were immediately greeted as friends when we showed up and we had a wonderful time together with David and Grace Ann. It was here that a friendship to David and Grace Ann emerged and I am forever grateful for that.

It was also here that I began working with storytelling. I have been working with that more or less since then and it has been terrific. Since 2008 I have going to the Se’Moi conferences each year, while I have skipped most other prestigious management conferences. I have not gone to Critical Management Studies conferences or the discourse conferences for long and I have only gone once to the Academy of Management a few times.

What is important for me here is friendship. I come back each year because I want to see and share things with people that I consider to be close friends. It is probably not friendship in the way Agamben describes it, but it is the whole attitude of hospitality and openness towards strangers. In recent years I have also been travelling to Colombia and South Africa and have been able to establish close friendship despite the distance and despite great differences in the situations and contexts of which we live our lives. And why do I keep going back to South Africa and Colombia? Because of friendship.

Storytelling has no doubt been important, because it has given me a vocabulary to work with how I relate to other people, how I work with educating other people; in short what I believe in in research, in teaching and in life itself. In recent years we have also increasingly theorized about it in relation to education (Jørgensen & Strand 2011; Jørgensen, Strand & Thomassen 2012) and carried it out in our teaching activities (Jørgensen, Klee and Canal 2014), where we try to build up storytelling communities in the classroom and where the ability to relate to and collaborate with other people are built into the program.

We try to approach the students as beings who count as such. The classroom is thus very participative-driven and we work with pedagogic principles that make it multi-voiced. We work with what it means to be present in the moment and explore the living stories. As an important part of that we bring in artifacts in the classroom and have material story lab sessions (Strand 2012).

Does that mean that we do not impose ourselves on the students? Absolutely not! We do for example choose the literature the students have to read. We choose the particular subjects and themes of each class. We choose the setting and design the learning situations. We evaluate students, supervise them, assess them and we are not always good in connecting with people – at least I am not. All these things are part of the complex apparatus of the learning setting and where we provide a particular stage for the development of the students’ stories.

So we do exercise violence; we do it in order to teach them to be ethical and friendly. That is the paradox of friendliness and ethics. The only thing we can do is to try to be very careful and reflective about how we do this and work with our own stories.
QUANTUM STORYTELLING AND FRIENDSHIP

What is quantum storytelling and its relation to friendship? David had traveled to Denmark, to Aalborg University, at the request of Kenneth. David was then invited by then doctoral student, Anete Strand to read Karen Barad’s book. Kenneth had been coming to sc’Moi, and the following year, Anete came there presenting on Barad’s work in relation to storytelling. She calls it ‘material storytelling’ and in 2012, David served as external examiner for her dissertation (2012).

In 2011, the first annual Quantum Storytelling conference was held in Las Cruces, New Mexico (see http://peaceaware.com/quantum). In 2012 the second one was held. Those in attendance were doing dissertations or articles on quantum storytelling. Quantum storytelling is defined, by 1st author, as the interfusion of quantum materiality with storytelling. There are several kinds of materiality rhetorics, from representationalist, to Russian Formalist, to structuralist, postmodernist, and poststructuralist.

Work was being done to relate these various materialist standpoints, some epistemic, and others, ontologic, to storytelling. This resulted in a quantum storytelling. Barad and Strand favored Bohr’s approach, where the observer effect is an observer apparatus. 1st author, here, favored a Heisenberg materialist ontology, where a more quantum consciousness storytelling interdiffuses with the quantum materiality (collapsing the wave, in wave-particle duality).

What is friendship in relation to quantum storytelling? It is an embodied approach, where the subatomic energy of bodies are interrelated, and these are interrelated to all living things, to the wave-particle subatomic energy that is unseen, yet agential. What does this mean in practical terms? The friends have a different quantum energy frequency (wave amplitude, wavelength) than do enemies. You can feel the quantum vibrations. We have caught it in a third term, which is ‘friendship as a way of living’. What is the difference?

So far we have been talking about friendship as an attitude to life and as a way of relating to other people. ‘Friendship as a way of living’ is broader and takes us beyond the strictly human domain. It also involves love, compassion and care for what you do in life no matter if it is baby-sitting, writing, teaching, cooking, cleaning and so forth. It also involves the relationship of natural resources, animals, artifacts and other things.

In other papers we have applied this to a more material and quantum understanding of living stories, which is defined as iterative intra-activity – a time and place of collectively lived participation with the world that is here and now (e.g. Boje, Jørgensen & Strand, 2013; Jørgensen & Strand, 2014). Living stories are stories in-the-making; a performative, enacted and embodied material way of being that is part of identity in the making. Living stories are material stories in the sense of being made up of material-discursive (re)storying actions (Strand, 2012, p. 46).

In this sense quantum storytelling proposes some amendments to the deconstructive approach to friendship and it has also been reflected at some points during the writing of the article. For example we have used terms like diffraction instead of deconstruction and material-discursive practices instead of discourse or discursive practices for instance. Terms like diffraction and material-discursive practices come from American philosopher Karen Barad and the quantum physics approach to philosophy and ethics that she has developed.

They are entangled with other important concepts like intra-activity instead of intra-action, ethics of mattering instead of ethics of Otherness (Levinas) or ethics of questioning (Derrida), being-of-the-world instead of being-in-discourse. How is this positioned in relation to Derrida? To being with we can take Derrida’s notion of story, where we argued that it is entangled in a play with other stories and it is living, becoming and alive in the here and now. In other words we are intertwined and mixed up with one another. Our relationships are never ‘pure’ but are framed by language, discourse, culture and power as we noted above.

But it is actually here that Barad diverges from Derrida and other poststructuralist thinkers in insisting that we are entangled not only with one another but also with only non-human agential forces like space, materiality, nature, animals etc. We are of-the-world and made from the same substances as the rest of the world. As such we are in a constant diffractive state as we become entangled with, recreated and modified through dis/continuous (Strand, 2012) iterative intra-active human and non-human forces.

Barad uses the term intra-action to denote that meaning and matter relies on dynamic mutual constituent discursive and material forces. Entanglement captures this aspect in the sense that it does not only refer to being intertwined with one another but rather that entities lack an independent self-contained existence (Barad, 2007, p. ix). The world does in other words not consist of separate entities that interact with each other as it is implied by terms like interaction or
interconnection. Rather entities are phenomena that emerge from iterative intra-activity. Therefore she also uses the term diffraction because it attends to the relational nature of difference (ibid, p. 73).

We are ‘mattering’ bodies where our language, actions, our whole body is material-discursive and thus where history, space, materiality are inscribed and reconfigured in everything we say and do. Since human beings are not in charge of the world but are of-the-world, we have to replace our attention from what goes in the human mind to the inherently entangled intra-active relationship of mind, body, spatiality and materiality.

What does this imply in terms of friendship? There at least two implications. The first one has to with the inherent materiality of friendship. Changes in the material conditions might change the conditions for friendship because such changes, as well as changes in discourse, change the way connections, commitments and relations are organized.

In the history of quantum physics the relationship between the former friends Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg was dramatically changed because of the break out of the second world war. We however see such examples everyday, as our institutions, organizations and communities have become much more fluid and unstable due to complex and non-transparent connections across the globe (e.g. ibid, p. 223).

Several scholars follow Heisenberg in ways that presage a quantum storytelling. For example, John Dewey (1929/1984) after reading Heisenberg’s (1927) Indeterminacy Principle, and developing his own interpretation of observer effect; Dewey (1908, 1929/1984) switched from empiric-pragmatism to an ontologic-pragmatism. Martin Heidegger (1977) Question Concerning Technology, credits Heisenberg’s quantum physics.

In this sense our friendships are under more pressure than they used to be. It also has implications for how we think about friendship. In some sense it is not enough to have an attitude of friendship towards other people. It is also necessary to try to become friends with the world and extend our love and compassion to non-human agents also.

Barad refers to this as an ethics of mattering, which is a third kind of responsibility ethics. The two others are ‘ethics of Otherness’ and ‘ethics of questioning’ (Jørgensen, Klee & Canal, 2013). The important point is that responsibility becomes a condition of living. It means that ethics and friendship is expanded from a strictly anthropocentric basis towards an eco-centric one. Friendship cannot be restricted to human encounters alone but includes human as well as non-human agents.

As noted we are entangled becomings of iterative material-discursive forces. Therefore we are always already responsible to the human and non-human agents with whom or which we are entangled because it is through these entanglements we make our daily living (Ibid, p. 393). We cannot transform into a very clear answer for what to do.

Ethics of mattering is always a call for inquiring deeper into situations thereby recognizing the inherent complexity and the plurality of human and non-human voices that are always present. In an ethics of mattering, everything is agential and sacred in the productive sense that everything we do with the world matters and as such requires our attention, commitment and compassion. As such ethics of mattering is a call for trying to be friends with the world because we share this world with others and because we rely on this world.

What is Quantum Hermeneutics? It is defined as a posthumanist hermeneutics, a hermeneutics of systems-antisystems where instead of billiard-ball physics, materiality has several definitions: representationalist, historical materialist, postmodern materialist, Althusserian materialist, and quantum materialist (Boje, 2013). Instead of hermeneutic circle, its endless sameness cycle, quantum hermeneutics is a double spiral process.

Quantum hermeneutic spiral includes the upward spiraling and the downward spiraling forces of substantive, quantitative, qualia, and potentia. It also fits the kind of Heisenberg Indeterminacy Principle, in relation to the pragmatist turn form James (1907) empiric-pragmatism to Dewey’s (1929) ontologic-pragmatism, the later rooted in the work of Heisenberg (1927).

This is a good place to begin to sort out pragmatist hermeneutics in relation to quantum hermeneutics and then to sort out the relation to the 11 D’s. However, as friends, the authors are working out respective allegiances to Barad’s seminal work, who favors Bohr’s quantum approach, and finds Heisenberg’s approach too epistemic. On the other side of the friendship, David has developed an ontologic reading of Heisenberg, and moved away from Barad in recent writing on ontologic-pragmatism (aka pragmatist-storytelling ontology).

"Systemicity is David’s replacement word for the outdated static linear-hierarchic conception of whole system” (Boje, 2008a: 29). System has become a modernist monologic illusion, seeing system everywhere. It is misplaced concreteness, naive. Mikhail Bakhtin (1981, p. 152) uses the term "systematicalness" to denote unmerged parts and unfinalized non-wholeness, what David is calling systemicity, is similar, however includes as well, the antisystemic.
Open systems thinking generalizes with abstractions at a distance from systemicity (Boje, 2008). This systemicity is comprised of relatum, four kinds of antenarrative-relata: linear-, cyclic-, spiral-, and rhizomatic (Boje, 2001, 2011). The only way to move beyond open systems theory is to treat systemicity pragmatically by looking at the practical facts of Being-in-the-world, ontologically and quantumly if we take organizations to be monological systems (of single relata system-wholeness of all parts) or to be poly-materialist systemicities (multi-relata).

William James (1907) developed the closest thing to antesystemicity thinking. Pragmatism looks at how systemicity passes from "the vague to definite, from the abstract to the concrete" (p. 92). James presents eight steps in what we call an empiricist "Pragmatist Antesystemicity" alternative to Open Systems Theory. Dewey (1929) on the other hand, turns pragmatism towards the ontologic by developing ways of dealing with not only complexity, but also indeterminacies of the quantum situation.

In this summary table (1), we contrast eight problems James raises with [open] systems theory, and eight problems Nick Herbert (1985) raises with quantum mechanics, and applied them to our hermeneutical understanding of antesystemicity theory. We can make linkages between the eight pragmatic options and the eight quantum options.

### Table 1: How Pragmatic Systemicity relates to Quantum Systemicities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pragmatic Systemicities</th>
<th>Linkages</th>
<th>Quantum Systemicities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 One subject of discourse OR Many subjects of discourse</td>
<td>1 No deep realities OR any deeper realities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Continuous parts OR Discontinuous part</td>
<td>2 Systemicity created by observer OR Observer does not matter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Single path network OR Innumerable path networks</td>
<td>3 Systemicity undivided wholeness OR Pluralized Systemicities without wholeness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 One path of influence OR Many paths of non-influence</td>
<td>4 Systemicity in many parallel universes OR Just one systemic universe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 One causal unity Or Causal plurality</td>
<td>5 Quantum logic does not obey human logic OR Only human logic</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 One unity of purpose OR Each step brings unforeseen chances</td>
<td>6 Neorealism – systemicity made of ordinary material objects OR it is made of non-ordinary materialities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 One BME retrospective narrative OR Many partial stories with prospection</td>
<td>7 Consciousness creates material-reality OR Material-Real impervious to consciousness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 One universal substance One Knower sees all OR Pluralistic substances overlapping with many knowers</td>
<td>8 Duplex world: twofold potentialities and actualities OR One world: potentials equal actuals</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Life does not transact itself in a purely epistemological or rationalistic dimension, nor on just an empiric dimension. The epistemic turns towards the past, in acts of retrospective-sense-giving, the make prospective (telos) towards repetition of sameness of the past. Empiric verifies the correctness if ideas in a "mass of verification experience" (James, 1907, p. 146). Pragmatists turn towards the future, in relation of some experience to the "sum total of the world's experience" (p. 146). The pragmatist faces forward, while the epistemologist faces backwards, and the empiricist faces the present.
"We live forwards, a Danish thinker has said, but we understand backwards. The present sheds a backward light on the world's previous processes. They may have been truth-processes for the actors in them. They are not for one who knows the later revelations of the story" (James, 1907, p. 146). By 1929, Dewey embraced a more ontologic- and quantum-pragmatism, while Peirce (1877-1878, 1878) remained with epistemic-pragmasist (semiotics), and James with empiric-pragmatism. Fast forward to 2013 and there are varieties of pragmatisms: epistemic-, empiric-, ontologic, and quantum-pragmatism are making inroads into management storytelling, its theory, research, and praxis.

Take the case of spiralization. The epistemologist names some vague, partial and naive ideas about Archemedian-spiral, or Logarithmic-spiral. The empiricist sets up verification processes of the ideas in the what is of the present observations of spiralization. That verification process can be as vague and naive as the epistemic ideas of spiral forms. The pragmatist connects the spiralization with life, the practical value-added results of the spiralization transaction be they 'subjective' ways of idealizing, or 'objective' ways of measuring spiralness.

This deranges commonsense epistemic and vague empiricist verification attempts. The pragmatist makes the monist spiral (Archemedian or Logrithmic) an hypothesis, by positing the possibility of a plurality of spiralization-kinds. This undergrows the monoism-spiral-ideas, so that direct face-to-face verifieration of present spiralness can take place. Since the pragmatist faces forward towards the future, the prolongations of the past is treated as a hypothesis, alongside the future arriving present, and matches up to the Heideggerian hermeneutics.

The pragmatist and the ontologist assumes that the understanding of the spiralization process is only partial, yet entirely empirical. Spiralizations are "the antediluvian monsters" (James, 1907, p. 141) with the datability of "dates and settings." Those antediluvian spiralization monsters of ancient past time, cohere everything in the present, as well as constituting a "leading-process" from future into the present (ibid).

Rather than behave according to the naive-spiral ideals, the spiralization process conforms its rootlets to the surrounding environmental contexts (landscape, timescapes, & materialscapes), and this affects the spiral-complexes' trajectory, its path through the environment. In the usual business of all spiralizations exist in kinds and not in monistic-singularity of Archemedian or Logarithmic spiral epistemology. There is speiness to spiralization that is so far without empirical verification.

We need empiric process of verificaton to move beyond the naive-spiral-abstractions. Pragmatists conclude that epistemic and empiric are not the only stock in trade (p. 138). We can do more than attempt to verify the epistemic spiral (mental) ideas. We can compare kinds of spiralizations to one another. Does this one have three stable orbits and that one only two? Does this one have more updrafts, and that one more downdrafts?

Does this one have fewer bridges that leap between orbits, than that other one? Does this one have more movement along a path in its surrounding environment? These concrete empiric verifications would take our spiralization scholarship beyond the naive and vague, and into "sensible facts of experience" (James, 1907, p. 138).

Spiralization awaits an ontological verification of its waywardness, plurality, fractal connections, and disclosability of its hidden workings, by eye-witness evidence, a precise verifiability of movements of the orbits upward and downward, inward and outward of the entire systemicity, as well as the movement of the spiralization along a trajectory in context of Being-in-the-world, dwelling in space, in time. This would be the pragmatist exploration of the superstructure of spiralization, in the diameter of the orbits, their simultaneous directionality, and the mutations, we can call shape-shifting.

When you experience a spiralization event, please write it down in a notebook. Describe and document the particulars of the spiralization experience. Is the spiralness shot through with regularities, recurrences of sameness cycles, or is it orbits of difference that amplify or contract, in some sort of sequence? A loose spiralization description will miss the connections between the orbits, be vague about places, dates, distances, activities, hidden working, and paths, including the movement of paths in the environment.

The epistemology of representation of the 'real' in spiral-model, awaits the sphere of varification and valid-ation (p. 123) of the empiricist. Pragmatist hermeneutics instigates towards ways the parts of experience, past-present-future hang together in ways that are practical, useful, important, invaluable to human life. A more posthumanist pragmatist hermeneutics treats human as only one of many species, all spatially-important, temporally-important, and materially-important to the life of the planet, to all life of the planet.

I therefore want us to explain the particular spiralizations and spiralness of the anntesystemicity-systemicity-antisystemicities in a pragmatist discussion that moves beyond epistemic materialist-representationism, beyond empiric
materialist-conditions, and towards the practical ways of Being-in-the-world, ontologically (not in what is, rather in how understanding is hermeneutic).

We are put off by the vague and naive epistemic open systems theorizing. An ethnographic inquiry that takes a pragmatist description seriously, would question open systems thinking, as too rationalistic, monist, too much unity of causality, too much unity of the aesthetic narrative into monological beginning-middle-end emplotment (a rather shallow hermeneutics). Instead of the 1-to-1 representationalism of retrospection (looking backward), there is a quantum field beyond the "naif realism" of materialist-representationist approach (James, 1907, p. 122).

Pragmatist hermeneutics wreaks havoc with the common-sense spiral-representations of the epistemologists. Here we have focused on what happens with the scope of practical control of Nature's food and drinks, is put in the hands of agribusines in ways that is beyond the ground of common-sense, as children and the planet's ecosystemicity are being crushed by the antediluvian monster. Historicity and historicality are not the same. Epistemic has too much historicity (shallow rendition of surface history of a few heros), while the empiric denies history altogether in the cross-section mania. A pragmatist-ontological-hermeneutics would be refreshing, since it would be a study of historicaliness, not historicity.

What are the stages of the empiricist-pragmatist hermeneutics?

STAGE ONE: Question the common-sense retrospective (backward-looking) epistemic models (such as naive & vague Archimedian-spiral or Logarithmic-spiral shapes) that makes language (the naming of things) its ally (James, 1907, p. 124).

STAGE TWO: Question the vagueness of the empiric verification process of these epistemic models. From a pragmatist hermeneutics, "no one experience [is] occurring twice" (James, 1907, p. 119). There are different kinds of things, in manyness, with their own durations and extension, in flux of energetic experience, and episodes are successive, rather than independent, and therefore consequential one episode to the next (p 116-117).

STAGE THREE: Do a pragmatist criticism of the monoism, by searching out plurality of action, situated in environment (not in blankness). What are the quanta, qualia, the substances, and the quantities that make up what Aristotle calls the 'soul' of a process-complex.

Rather than a hermeneutic circle, how could James' stages be a hermeneutic-spiralization? Missing from James is the kind of ontological approach that Barad (following Bohr) favors in epistemic-ontology and Dewey favors in his interpretation of Heisenberg.

Instead of noetic monism (p. 112), a "noetic pluralism" hypothesis is put forth by a pragmatist hermeneutic spiralization. Instead of system being eternally complete, a hermeneutic spiralization occurs in gradual grafting on an soaking in of novelty experiences onto unaltered knowledge and unchanged habits of action, so that spiralization is describing a dynamic "changing" (p. 121) that "grows in spots" (p. 112) while "some old knowledge remains what is was" (p. 112).

Perhaps systemicity is not whole it all, merely loosely connect parts on a copula-assemblage. In that case, we would need a pragmatist rhizomatic-hermeneutics instead of a spiralization-hermeneutics; anything but a cyclic-hermeneutics. Peirce and James had the friendship tested as they moved to different standpoints on pragmatism.

Charles Sanders Peirce’s (1877-1878) series of articles in Popular Science, about maxims of ‘practical logic.’[1] Peirce (1905, pp. 163-4) would later say his pragmatist approach was a neo-Kantian reading of Kant’s (1785, p. 33) distinction between pragmatic and technical and moral reason: “One could also call the first imperative technical (belonging to art), the second pragmatic (to welfare), the third moral (belonging to free conduct in general, i.e., to morals).”

Today there is a wider variety of pragmatism, some of which apply quantum interpretations that are ontologic.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Pragmatists</th>
<th>Type of Pragmatism</th>
<th>Situated Social Science Philosophies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Charles Sanders Peirce</td>
<td>Semiotic</td>
<td>Epistemic-anti-ontologic</td>
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<tr>
<td>William James</td>
<td>Empiricist</td>
<td>Empiricist</td>
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Peirce did not renew his attempt to define pragmatism for some twenty years, not until after William James speeches (e.g., his California Union Address in 1898; 1903 Harvard lecture), that became part of James’s (1907) book. In point of fact, it was James (1898) first used the term ‘pragmatism’, but as he attributed it to Peirce’s 1878 writing, Peirce is often created with its first use. In any event, it motivated Peirce to revive his interest in it. Peirce’s (1905) pragmatism became more widely known due to James’ lectures and writings. Yet, Peirce was dissatisfied with James’s definition and approach pragmatism, and renamed his own ‘pragmaticism,’ which he said was ‘ugly enough to keep it safe from kidnappers’” (Peirce, 1905, p. 166). Peirce’s new term did not catch on in popular usage.

Table 3: Pragmatist and Quantum Hermeneutics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COMMON-SENSE-MAKING CATEGORIES</th>
<th>PRAGMATIST HERMENEUTICS</th>
<th>QUANTUM HERMENEUTICS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Thing:</td>
<td>Thing is changing (p. 121), in successive apparitions, appearances, alterations; in existences we do not see</td>
<td>Directionality: Heidegger (1962 BT, #109, p. 143) “out of directionality arise the fixed direction of right and left” &amp; “left and right are not something ‘subjective’ from which the subject has a feeling; they are directions of one’s directedness into a world that is ready-to-hand already”;</td>
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<td>2 The same or different;</td>
<td>Flux &quot;no one experiences occurring twice: (p. 119) [Hericlites]</td>
<td>Datability: Heidegger (1962 BT, #407, p. 459) “seemingly obvious relational structures which we call ‘datability’”; (#408, p. 441) Datability “is the most primordial way of assigning a time”; (#409, p. 462) “allowing oneself time concernfully”; (#422, p. 474) instead of a succession or a “‘flowing stream’ of nows” in “the course of time” that is a “present-at-hand) “world-time” he proposes “the datable ‘now’”, “In the ordinary interpretation of time as a sequence of ‘nows, both datability and significance are missing” and “covered-up” in a “datability” that “gets leveled off”; (#413, p. 466)</td>
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<td>3 Kinds;</td>
<td>Different kinds of things; manyness kinds exist (p. 120)</td>
<td>Deployment: Heidegger (1962 BT, p. 89) “the ‘in-order-to’, the ‘for-the-sake-of’, and the ‘with-which; of an involvement’ are “relationships in which concerned circumspection as such already dwells” [see dwelling-in]</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Minds;</td>
<td>Minds change in spots, a soaking in of novelty; Ways of thinking of remote ancestors can survive to present; Disclosability: Heidegger (75, p. 105) says “‘disclose’ and ‘disclosedness’ will be used as technical terms in the passages that follow, and shall signify ‘to lay open’ and ‘the character of having been laid open.’ Thus ‘to disclose’ never means anything like to obtain indirectly by inference’”; (#110, p. 145) “co-disclosedness of space”; (75, p. 105) “disclosedness; i.e. of a ‘whole ‘workshop’ – as that wherein concern always dwells” and “context of equipment is lit up” and “world announces itself”; (#175; p. 219) “The disclosedness of Being-in-the-world”; (#180, p. 224)</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Bodies;</td>
<td>Rather than static bodies, a pragmatist embodiment, in relation to others, in relation to the world &amp; universe Destining: Heidegger (QCT, p. 57) destining is not a succession of eras; (PLT) destining; (1962 BT, #56, p. 82) “Being-in-the-world” is bound up with “destiny” of Being of entities encountered, such as metal of corporeality of Being; (#344, p. 436) Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects”; (#385, p. 437) Generations of blacksmiths for example, form an historic community grounding in advance the possibilities in “Being of care” the “futural” and in “authentic historicity”; (#150, p. 191) destining is an “interpretation” “grounded in something we have in advance – in afore-having … fore-sight … fore-conception”; (#100, p. 110) “A warning signal, what is coming”; (#90, p. 111)</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>One Time</td>
<td>Plurality of times; not equally flowing times; everything has its own duration &amp; extension to next thing Duration: Heidegger (1962 BT, 18, p. 39) “Aristotle to Bergson and even later”; (ibid) “as against Bergson’s thesis that the time one has in mind in this conception is space” and is “ontic” and no longer has “authentic ontological relevance”; (#26, p. 49) duration is present-at-hand, as with Parmenides it is ontic. Kant and Bergson are too influenced by Aristotle’s essay on time in Physics book; (#47, p. 73) Bergson understands duration as “philosophical anthropology” of experiences; (#333, p. 382) critique of Bergson – “it is not an externalization of a ‘qualitative time’ into space, as Bergson’s Interpretation of time – which is ontologically quite indefinite and inadequate – would have us believe”; (#106, p. 140) “half an hour” is not thirty minutes but a duration which has no ‘length’ at all in the sense of a quantitative stretch” (ibid) duration is “the pathways we take: that “vary in length from day to day”; (ibid) Duration is not a stretch of space or time, or corporeal Thing” present-at-hand, rather it is ready-at-hand “a kind of concernful Being:; (#106, pp. 140-1) “a pathway which is long ‘Objectively; can be, much shorter than one which is ‘Objectively’ shorter still but which is perhaps ‘hard going’ and comes before us as interminably long” yet is “authentically ready-to-hand”</td>
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<td>Page</td>
<td>One Space</td>
<td>Plurality of spaces; map is not the territory</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Subjects and attributes;</td>
<td>Rather than unit-subjects with interchangeable attributes, pragmatist looks to sense-qualities in concrete experiences</td>
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Dwelling: Heidegger (1962 BT, #54, p. 80) “to dwell” signifies Being-in and means “I reside” or “dwell alongside” the world; (# 61, p. 89) we can look at the work from a viewpoint, “such looking-at enters the mode of dwelling autonomously alongside entities within-the-world. In this kind of ‘dwelling’ as a holding-onself-back from any manipulation or utilization, the perception of the present-at-hand is consummated”; (#80, p. 111) “Signs always indicate primarily ‘wherein’ one lives, where one’s concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something” such as equipment “ready-to-hand”; (#107, p. 141)

De-severance: Heidegger (1962 BT, # 107) “Because Dasein is essentially spatial in the way of de-severance, its dealings always keep within an ‘environment; which is desevered from it with a certain leeway…. Accordingly our seeing and hearing always go proximally beyond what is distantly ‘closest.’”. “Occupying a place must be conceived as a desevering of the environmentally ready-to-hand into a region which has been circumspectively discovered in advance”; (#108: p. 143) “Both directionality and de-severance, as modes of Being-in-the-world, are guided beforehand by the circumspection of concern”; (#109, p. 144) “De-severance and directionality as constitutive characteristics of Being-in are determinative for Dasein’s spatiality – for being concernfully and circumspectively in space, in space discovered and within-the-world”; (#299-300, p. 346) “Being-in-the-world has a spatiality of its own, characterized by the phenomena of de-severance and directionality”
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<th>Page</th>
<th>Causal influences; Antediluvian (time before the flood) where everything is significant &amp; excerts influence</th>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Drafts: Heidegger (1971 PLT: 130) Boje’s spiral-antenarrative processes of the thingness of things is in the path of caring, of what Heidegger calls the widest “orbit of the whole draft” (PLT, 1971, 130). The widest orbit of the spiral-antenarrative is an unshieldedness, Boje calls “inner ♥ space of our worldly existence” based on Heidegger’s “heart’s space” concept, “inward the true interior of the heart’s space” (p: 130). The spiral-antenarrative is a primordial path from birth through death, downward ”where all ground breaks off- into the abyss” (PLT, 1971: 119), and upwards, into that end of this life, and into the afterlife. The above figure integrates Heidegger’s (PLT, 1971: 128) ideas of a draft-center as attracting our path, draft-center, within the entire Being-in-the-world of the spherical forces of the whole integral draft space-time. The other attractor is the whole sphere (space-time) forces of integral draft. These define the simultaneous forces of the spiral-sphere. The spiral-antenarrative activities and processes are in the “sphereicity of the unifying” a sort of lightning” (PLT, 1971: p: 123). This is the draft attraction of place. The well-roundedness of the spiral-sphere can be “thought of as the Being of beings in the sense of the unconcealing-lightning unifying” (ibid, p. 123). “The widest orbit is the wholeness of the whole draft of attraction: (ibid, p. 124). “When we are touched from out of the widest orbit, the touch goes to our very nature” (ibid, p. 125), in the “globe of Being” (p: 124). For more see Boje (2012b, on line, <a href="http://peaceaware.com/Boje/index.htm">http://peaceaware.com/Boje/index.htm</a></td>
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<th>The fancied; Primitive people believed fancies and real were inextricably related; liveliness pursues influenced real; dreams and real related</th>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Dispersion: Heidegger (1962 BT, # 109, p. 144) “the equipment-context of a world”; (#110; p. 145) “equipment-context ready-to-hand”; (#112, p. 147) “totality of places belonging to equipment ready-to-hand”; (#390, p. 442 “dispersion” and “disconnectedness” arises in an “inauthentic historicality”; (#390, p. 442) “dispersal” of “unity” “our lostness” in the “they”; (#391, p. 442) “The Self’s resolution against the inconstancy of distraction”; Another dispersion of processes is a “dispersal” away from “unity” in a shop by following too many other people’s ways of doing blacksmithing, which is the “they-sell” mimicking of other iron artists (Heidegger 1962 BT, #392, p. 444).</td>
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### CONCLUSIONS

We have developed a notion of friendship as a way of living. This is first and foremost an attitude to life based on the statement ‘I have no enemies, everyone is my friend’. Instead it describes an attitude to the people and to the practices that we somehow and for some reason become engaged with in our lives. Friendship is love of life instead of being guided by a desire to dominate, by fear or by treating others with mistrust.

It is an alternative to much current management thinking based on control and governance, and which is destructive of life. Friendship is a storyteller’s attitude to life and it contains positive energies and vibrations instead of destructive energies. We have argued that it is here we think that Derrida’s writings on friendship are helpful because at the outset it contains this loving relationship to other people.

Further, we have developed some appreciations of the friendship of Bohr and Heisenberg, and how some of their differences in quantum interpretation have spiraled through American Pragmatist friendships of James, Dewey, and Peirce. Dewey and James, for example, were once closely aligned in empiricist-pragmatism, but Dewey after 1929 moved to an ontologic-pragmatist position.

The American Pragmatists one met regularly at the turn of the century, but Peirce retained his epistemic-pragmatist alignment to a neo-Kantian approach that favored deductive logic and eschewed the materiality, and the turn in pragmatism to an ontologic (following Dewey’s interpretation of Heisenberg). The authors, fast-forwarding today, have their friendship tested as one favors Bohr, and the other has moved from Bohr (and Barad) towards Dewey’s ontologic-pragmatism. Yet we do remain friends.

### REFERENCES


http://146.230.128.54/undphil/collier/308/Peirce/Peirce's%20_How%20to%20Make%20Our%20Ideas%20Clear.pdf